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1
I N T R O D U C T I O N
The global banking sector has changed enormously in the last decades: banks have
assumed increasingly more diverse roles in the economy. This diversification of bank
activities has made daily bank practice very opaque and complex, such that investors,
consumers and regulators are hampered in getting correct, complete information while
dealing with banks. The rapid innovations in the financial sector have contributed
greatly to these informational asymmetries. While banks have found new ways to
shed risk and liquify their balance sheets, they became more opaque and correlated in
the process. The financial crisis of 2008 and 2009 has made this very clear in a painful
way (Brunnermeier, 2009).
Due to this crisis it is now recognized that a large part of bank risk is now sys-
temic instead of idiosyncratic: banks pose a risk to the financial system as a whole.
The reform of the regulatory and supervisory framework takes this problem seriously,
as both measurement and containment of systemic risk have become paramount. Fur-
thermore, the safety net and resolution mechanisms have to be redesigned to not only
cope with Too-Big-to-Fail (as before), but also with Too-Connected- or Too-Many-to-
Fail situations.
The financial crisis has also confirmed that, due to the increased opacity of banks,
it has become more difficult for regulators to distinguish liquidity from solvency
problems. According to Bagehot (1873) it is sensible to provide assistance to a bank
in need of temporary funding (liquidity), provided that this bank will have positive
charter value in the longer run (solvency). However, many banks that have been
assisted during the crisis turned out to be insolvent ex post, even those that were
not of systemic importance. Because of their opacity it was not possible to verify
asset quality ex ante. As a consequence these insolvent banks had to be bailed out
by governments and deposit insurance institutions (such as the US FDIC). These
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authorities have provided banks with debt guarantees and equity capital, which have
been very costly to taxpayers in the United States and Europe alike (Acharya et al.,
2009; Panetta et al., 2009).
As other crises (such as the Great Depression in the 1930s or the Savings and Loans
crisis in the 1980s) have done before, the recent crisis has prompted a paradigm shift.
The world’s financial system will change significantly in the near future. At the same
time, its regulation and the institutions enforcing it, such as central banks, will have
to be redesigned (Cukierman, 2011). The financial safety net, which comprises deposit
insurance, the lender of last resort and other safeguards, is part of this regulatory
framework. Serious reforms, not in the least politically, are needed to create a safety
net that can prevent financial disasters while also preventing imprudent behaviour by
financial institutions. This will require going back to the drawing table and combining
new insights with old, fundamental concepts.
An important concept, prevalent prior to the crisis and perhaps useful today, is
that of constructive ambiguity: central banks would be ambiguous about whether they
would provide assistance or not. This was intended to prevent regulatory forbearance,
endogeneity of central bank policy and the “gaming” of the safety net. However, since
the start of the financial crisis policymakers have not been able to adhere to ambiguity,
as they have provided practically unlimited support to the financial system. This does
not only concern systemically important institutions (which will always be saved), but
also less important banks which, in isolation, should not have been assisted.
The chairmen of the European Central Bank and the United States Federal Reserve
have even stated explicitly that they are standing ready to act if banks (or countries,
for that matter) are in need of assistance, be it temporary or not. This de facto blanket
guarantee provides scope for moral hazard by financial institutions and may prove to
be very costly to society if maintained for a long time. Reinstating a framework with
ambiguity, built on central bank credibility and reputation, may therefore be more
sustainable in the long run.
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This dissertation investigates in which way banks created (excessive) systemic risk
and, subsequently, analyzes how the financial safety net can affect risk taking. In
particular, the first part of this dissertation investigates empirically in which way
banks increased their systemic risk. The theoretical analysis in the second part of the
dissertation (consisting of three chapters) will be informative for setting up a new
system of liquidity and solvency assistance to banks.
Chapter two contributes to the recognition that systematic bank risk and correlation
should also be taken into account in measuring systemic risks. It is an investigation
into banks’ use of credit risk transfer instruments and its effect on individual and
systemic risk before the crisis. The two credit risk transfer instruments considered
in this study are Credit Default Swaps (CDS) and Collateralized Loan Obligations
(CLOs). CDS are derivatives that are used to trade the risk on underlying assets on
banks’ balance sheets, while CLOs are structured products that remove risks from
these balance sheets.
Using two samples of banks respectively trading CDS and issuing CLOs, the system-
atic risk of banks as perceived by the market is studied. After their first use of either
risk transfer method, the share price beta of these banks increases significantly. This
suggests the market anticipated the risks arising from these methods, long before the
crisis. What is more, this increase in risk lasts until the end of the sample and the effect
from CLOs is larger than that from CDS.
This beta effect can be separated into a volatility and a market correlation compo-
nent. This exercise reveals that volatility decreases while correlation increases, which
means that the increase in the beta is solely due to an increase in banks’ correlations.
Thus, while banks may have shed their individual credit risk, they have increased their
importance for the financial system. This creates a challenge for financial regulation,
which has typically focused on individual institutions. As has been stressed in recent
debates on new regulation, measuring and accounting for systemic risk will become a
central part of the new regulatory framework.
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The second part of this dissertation, which contains three different theoretical anal-
yses, deals with reforming the regulatory framework. It focuses on crisis management
of individual banks in distress, and thus on the interaction between a bank and a
regulator in times of crisis. This interaction is modeled by employing noncooperative
game theory. While this modeling feature is shared by all three models, they also dif-
fer in several respects. The following table delineates the differences and similarities
between the models in the respective chapters.
Table 1.1: Overview of model features








Time structure Static Dynamic Dynamic






Ambiguity No Yes Yes
In all three models there is a bank that chooses its liquidity buffer to cope with id-
iosyncratic liquidity risk. Additionally, the bank can always turn to the central bank to
ask for liquidity assistance. In chapter three this form of safety net is complemented
with a fiscal authority, i.e. the ministry of finance, that can provide solvency assistance.
Therefore, this model also contains uncertainty about solvency or asset risk, as the
bank’s asset quality is not known. Chapters four and five then focus on the concept
of constructive ambiguity, which is not present in chapter three. To clarify the analy-
sis, these models constrain attention to the game between bank and central bank. In
addition, the game in chapters four and five is dynamic, instead of static, to capture
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banker’s myopia. Finally, the feature that distinguishes chapters four and five from
each other is regulatory uncertainty. This means that the central bank’s mandate is not
known, which provides an explicit foundation for constructive ambiguity.
Chapter three examines in a theoretical manner how illiquidity and insolvency res-
olution interact and affect banks’ incentives. During the recent financial crisis, central
banks have provided liquidity and governments have set up rescue programmes to
restore confidence and stability, often against the Lender of Last Resort principle ad-
vocated by Bagehot. The chapter analyzes Bagehot’s principle in a stylized model of
to assess the effect of liquidity assistance and bailouts on individual bank risk taking.
The model features a systemic bank suffering from idiosyncratic liquidity shocks
that cannot be resolved through the interbank market; we assume a crisis situation.
Furthermore, there is only imperfect supervisory information on the bank’s solvency.
Without any form of safety net in place, the bank keeps too much liquidity and
monitors too little compared to the social optimum. A central bank can alleviate
liquidity problems, but induces moral hazard. Therefore, a fiscal authority that is able
to provide solvency assistance is introduced. This assistance, also known as a bailout,
can take place by injecting capital at a fixed return (debt) or by claiming a part of
bank value (equity). Debt assistance decreases moral hazard and increases productive
investment, but has limited potential to alleviate solvency problems. Equity assistance
can alleviate all liquidity and solvency problems; it also decreases moral hazard and
increases investment. Thus, both manners of solvency assistance provide the right
incentives to the bank, while equity assistance can solve a broader range of problems.
The fourth chapter of this dissertation examines a central bank’s ability to follow a
constructive ambiguity policy in providing liquidity assistance to an individual bank.
This means that the central bank will not announce the conditions for liquidity assis-
tance ex ante; instead, it follows a mixed strategy. This ambiguity can dampen bailout
expectations that have led banks to behave imprudently, holding too little capital and
relying too much on short term funding to finance long term investments. Regulatory
forbearance can be mitigated by allowing the central bank to follow an ambiguous
liquidity assistance policy.
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This constructive ambiguity policy is investigated using a dynamic model of the
game between a bank and a regulator, i.e. the central bank/financial supervisor. The
bank chooses capital and liquidity ratios, while the institution providing liquidity as-
sistance can commit only to a mixed strategy in equilibrium. The reason behind this
is that never assisting the bank is too costly and therefore not credible, while always
providing liquidity causes moral hazard. In equilibrium, the bank chooses above min-
imum capital and liquidity, unless either capital costs or the opportunity cost of liq-
uidity are too high. Additionally, the probability of liquidity assistance is higher for
a regulator who is more concerned about bank failure, and when the penalty for the
bank is higher; this suggests that forbearance is not entirely eliminated by adhering to
constructive ambiguity.
One important assumption has to be satisfied for the constructive ambiguity
equilibrium to hold: the central bank must have sufficient credibility to adhere to this
strategy ex ante. This is quite a strong assumption, which deserves more investigation;
this is the topic of the final chapter.
The fifth and final chapter of this dissertation focuses on the notion that recent
actions by central banks in Europe and the US may lead banks to expect that central
banks will be lenient in the future. Will this expectation be justified? This question
can be answered by using the concept of regulatory ambiguity: the exact objective or
preference of the central bank is not public knowledge. This uncertainty can serve as
the basis for a constructive ambiguity strategy.
In the model there can be two types of central banks: a Hawk, which is tough,
and a Dove, which is lenient. There are two players: a bank and a central bank. The
central bank knows which type it is, but the bank does not. It can, however, infer
this by observing the regulator’s actions and will update its belief accordingly. The
central bank is able to build a reputation for being a Hawk if the uncertainty about its
nature is high enough. As a result it can credibly adhere to a constructive ambiguity
strategy, which will lead the bank to choose higher liquidity reserves in equilibrium.
Furthermore, increasing bank capital and penalty rates make it easier to build a
reputation, while bailouts by the fiscal government make it more difficult. In the end,
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by not disclosing its true preference the central bank is able to follow a policy of
constructive ambiguity.
The results in this dissertation have implications for the reform of financial regu-
lation and the safety net. By becoming more correlated banks have made themselves
systemic, which meant they could not fail without severely damaging the system. We
need a new regulatory and supervisory framework that properly takes into account
idiosyncratic and systemic risks. In this framework central banks will assume the role
of supervisor, but also that of the Lender of Last Resort. This will have to be com-
plemented with a properly designed resolution mechanism, such that governments
can assist banks at a suitable penalty. Furthermore, to prevent imprudent behaviour
by financial institutions central banks can resort to a policy of constructive ambigu-
ity. A necessary prerequisite, however, is that they have a good reputation that lends
credibility to this policy.

2
C R E D I T R I S K T R A N S F E R A C T I V I T I E S A N D S Y S T E M I C R I S K :
H O W B A N K S B E C A M E L E S S R I S K Y I N D I V I D U A L LY B U T P O S E D
G R E AT E R R I S K S T O T H E F I N A N C I A L S Y S T E M AT T H E S A M E
T I M E
This chapter is based on Nijskens and Wagner (2011).
2.1 introduction
The world financial system experienced a period of severe crisis in 2008 and 2009.
Many of the factors that have contributed to the turmoil, such as loose monetary pol-
icy or intense competition, have also been central in previous crises. A key novel ele-
ment in the current crisis, however, are the various ways through which banks have
transferred credit risk in the financial system. Banks traditionally shed only few risks
from their balance sheets, such as through loan sales or credit guarantees. This shed-
ding was mainly limited to credits that were informationally less sensitive, such as
consumer credit. In recent years, however, banks have dramatically increased their
risk transfer activities. For one, they have done this through the use of credit deriva-
tives, and mostly in the form of Credit Default Swaps (CDS). These instruments allow
banks to trade credit risks on a variety of exposures. The markets for CDS have grown
tremendously since their inception in 1996, with outstanding volumes estimated at
around U$ 10 trn before the start of the crisis. Spurred by new financial innovations,
banks have also significantly increased their securitization of assets. Particularly note-
worthy are the Collateralized Loan Obligations (CLOs) through which banks transfer
pools of loans from their balance sheet. While banks have frequently used loan sales
to reduce risk in the past, this new technique allowed banks to shed commercial loans
(typically the most informationally sensitive form of lending) on a large scale.
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The severity and the widespread nature of the current crisis indicate that these risk
transfer activities have increased the risks in at least some parts of the financial system.
A central question, however, is how this credit risk transfer (CRT) has affected the
banks that used it to transfer away risk. After all, the main rationale behind CRT is that
it allows fragile financial institutions to move risks to less fragile institutions and to
diversify away concentrated exposures. It was mainly for these reasons why regulators
initially endorsed these activities (IAIS, 2003; BIS, 2004). If even these institutions did
not benefit, there are important implications for the overall stability assessment of the
new CRT activities.
In a static sense, a properly done transfer of risk should of course reduce the banks’
risks. However, banks are likely to respond to any reduction in their risk. This may be
through various methods, such as by increasing their lending (Instefjord, 2005; Wag-
ner, 2007), by reducing their monitoring and screening efforts (Morrison, 2005) or by
leveraging up their capital structure (Jiangli and Pritsker, 2008). Banks’ responses may
also go beyond a pure offsetting of the risk that they have shed. This may be, for ex-
ample, because the new CRT methods provide banks with effective risk management
techniques. For example, CDS can be used to reduce risk concentrations in bank port-
folios. Better risk management generally allows banks to operate with riskier balance
sheets (Froot et al., 1993). Additionally, these new instruments may make banks less
averse to crisis situations. Banks may expect that they can more easily liquify parts
of their balance sheet, such as by doing an additional CLO (Cardone-Riportella et al.,
2010). This may further encourage risk-taking at banks (Wagner, 2007). Banks may
also end up being riskier because they fail to effectively transfer the risk. This may be
because a bank keeps the riskiest tranche in a securitization, or because of guarantees
(explicit or implicit) given to securitization vehicles.
CRT may also increase bank risk in a systemic sense, even if banks’ individual risk
does not increase. This is because securitization allows banks to shed idiosyncratic
exposures, such as the specific risk associated with their area of lending. The idiosyn-
cratic share in a bank’s risk may also be lowered because banks may hedge any un-
diversified exposures they may have by buying protection using CDS, while simul-
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taneously buying other credit risk by selling protection in the CDS market.1 Banks
may thus end up being more correlated with each other. This may amplify the risk of
systemic crisis in the financial system (Elsinger et al., 2006; Acharya and Yorulmazer,
2007; Wagner, 2008) since it increases the likelihood that banks incur losses jointly (a
situation experienced in the current crisis). Securitization typically also exposes banks
to greater funding risk. Such risks are mostly systemic in nature, as current events have
shown, since the markets for securitized assets and the markets for funding those as-
sets may collapse. For example, the problems for securitization vehicles to refinance
themselves during 2008 forced banks to provide liquidity lines to these vehicles or
take assets back on their balance sheet. Banks additionally suffered because, due to
the breakdown of the securitization market, they were no longer able to sell the assets
they had originated for securitization purposes. Effectively, banks found risks they
transferred away flowing back to their balance sheets.
In this paper we explore some of the aspects of the relationship between CRT ac-
tivities and the riskiness of banks. For this we focus on bank risk as perceived by the
market through bank share prices. We analyze a sample of banks that started trading
Credit Default Swaps and a sample of banks that issued Collateralized Loan Obliga-
tions between 1997 and 2006. We study whether the adoption of any of the two CRT
methods is associated with a change in the bank’s perceived risk. Our results indicate
that this is the case: the first use of either CLO or CDS is associated with a signif-
icant permanent increase in a bank’s risk, as measured by its share price beta. The
effect is also economically important: the beta at CLO banks increases by 0.21, while
for CDS banks it increases by 0.06.2 Furthermore, the larger effect we find for CLOs
(compared to CDS) can be explained by the fact that CLOs allow for the shedding of a
much larger variety of exposures (by contrast, the liquid market for CDS is limited to
around 600-900 firms worldwide). The adoption of this new CRT tool is hence likely
to be also accompanied by a larger response by banks. We also find that CLOs initially
1 In fact, most banks simultaneously buy and sell credit risk in CDS markets.
2 Keeping in mind that share prices reflect expected future profits, this effect should not be interpreted as
the direct effect of either CRT method, but as the market’s anticipation of a different behaviour of these
banks in the future. Interestingly we also find that a sample of matched banks that did not undertake
CLOs experienced a decline in their betas. This suggests that CLO banks increased their activities at the
expense of other banks.
12 credit risk transfer activities and systemic risk
decrease bank risk. This is plausible since the CLO itself (if it is a true sale) removes
a substantial amount of risks from a bank’s balance sheet, which may only be later
offset by increased bank risk-taking. There is no such negative effect for CDS. Quite
to the contrary, CDS even increase bank risk more in the short run. This may be the
result of banks actually using CDS to source new credit risk (such as by selling protec-
tion in the CDS market).3 We also find that our results are relatively robust in various
subsamples, which are created by splitting CRT banks according to profitability, loan
growth and maturity structure of their liabilities.
Next, we study whether the increase in bank risk is due to higher individual bank
risk, or due to higher systemic risk. For this we split a bank’s beta into its standard de-
viation relative to the market’s standard deviation (individual risk) and its correlation
with the market (systemic risk). Perhaps surprisingly, we find that the increase in beta
is purely due to an increase in the correlation. The individual risk of CRT banks in
fact even goes down. This suggests that the increase in bank risk is not simply due to
banks overcompensating the risk they have shed. Rather it is due to the fact that CRT
activities expose banks to greater systemic risk.4
These findings identify a challenge for financial regulation. Banks engaging in CRT
activities seem to pose more systemic risk even though they become individually less
risky. Standard measures of bank risk commonly used by regulators, such as the
amount of risk-weighted assets, fail to capture this.5 In fact, due to the diversifica-
tion presumably achieved by CRT, banks have been able to lower their capital require-
ments, allowing them to extend their lending and thus contributing to the current
turmoil. Our results highlight that in a world characterized by an active transfer of
credit risk in the financial system, effective regulation should pay more attention to a
bank’s contribution to systemic risk, rather than to its individual risk (for a theoretical
foundation of such regulation see Lehar (2005) and Wagner (2009)).
3 This is consistent with the fact that banks in our sample buy more credit risk than they sell.
4 Our results are consistent with the findings of Adrian and Brunnermeier (2008) who show that the value
at risk conditional on another institution being in distress has increased at financial institutions in recent
years.
5 An interesting implication of our analysis is that, even though traditional measures of bank risk may
have failed to capture the higher risk at CRT banks, the market seems to have been aware of this since
bank betas increased well before the crisis.
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Our findings are consistent with other studies that emphasize that credit risk trans-
fer has important effects on bank risk. Franke and Krahnen (2007) and Hänsel and
Krahnen (2007) investigate European Collateralized Debt Obligation (CDO) issues and
find a (small) positive effect of CDOs on (securitizing) bank betas.6 Uhde and Michalak
(2010) confirm these findings of increasing bank risk using a larger and more compre-
hensive dataset with European banks. As a possible explanation of this risk increase,
Goderis et al. (2007) find that a bank increases its loan-to-asset ratio subsequent to
the first issuance of a CLO. Foos et al. (2010) conclude that bank loan growth leads
to higher bank risk, including a worsening of the risk-return structure and decreasing
bank solvency. Hirtle (2009) shows that U.S. banks which purchase protection using
credit derivatives raise their supply of loans. Jiangli and Pritsker (2008) provide evi-
dence that banks increased their risk in response to securitization by increasing their
leverage. Marsh (2006) presents evidence that the excess equity return effect of an-
nouncing a new bank loan is mitigated when the lending bank actively trades in credit
derivatives. This suggests lower bank monitoring and hence higher risk-taking. Keys
et al. (2010) find that securitized assets have a higher probability of default than assets
with comparable characteristics that are not securitized, consistent with lower screen-
ing efforts by banks. In a more general setting, Calmès and Théoret (2010) find that
off-balance sheet activities increase a bank’s systemic risk. Our findings complement
the results of the abovementioned studies, as the identified changes in bank behavior
may also contribute to higher systemic risk.
We proceed as follows. The next section describes the data and the methodology.
Section 2.3 contains the empirical results. The final section concludes.
2.2 data and methodology
We construct two separate datasets for CLO and CDS banks. Information about CLO
issuance is obtained from the ABS Alert database. This database contains information
on various types of rated securitization around the world. There are 52 banks in this
6 The larger magnitude of our estimates is consistent with the notion that in the current crisis most prob-
lems arising from securitization assets originated outside Europe (the U.S. mainly). Indeed, we find that
the magnitude of the beta effect is smaller if we constrain our sample to European banks.
14 credit risk transfer activities and systemic risk
database that are reported to have issued at least one CLO between June 1996 (the
date of the first CLO ever) and September 2004 (which marks the end of our data set).
For each of these banks we obtain the date when they issued their first CLO. We then
obtain from Datastream7 daily equity returns from six months prior to the first CLO
date in our dataset to six months after the last date. We drop all banks for which no
(or only incomplete) equity data was available. This leaves us with 35 CLO banks with
complete share price data, of which 21 are European, 7 are North-American, 6 are
Japanese and one is Australian. The sample period we ultimately use for CLO banks
runs from January 1997 to March 2005.
Information about CDS trading comes from the U.S. FDIC Call Reports. For each
bank that ever trades in CDS after December 1998 (the date from which on banks were
required to report their CDS exposure) until September 2005, we identify the quarter in
which the bank first started trading CDS. This trading may be on the buy or on the sell
side (but typically both dates coincide). There are 82 such banks. However, for banks
reporting in the last quarter of 1998 we do not know when they actually started trading,
as the requirement to report was only in force from that quarter onwards. Since they
could have started trading before this point in time, we have to drop these banks. Then,
we again use Datastream to obtain data on daily share prices from 6 months before the
first CDS date to 6 months after the last CDS date. This leaves us with 38 CDS banks
with complete share price data, of which 9 are European, 25 are North-American, 2
are Asian and 2 are Australian.8 The sample period we finally use for CDS banks runs
from June 1998 to June 2006.9 We do not include the subprime crisis in our analysis
since we are interested in the market’s anticipation of the risk impact of CRT and not
how changes in risk may ultimately materialize. Moreover, including the subprime
crisis is likely to introduce substantial noise into the estimation.
Table 2.A.1 shows descriptive statistics for the CLO and CDS datasets. We can see
that both sets of CRT activities are fairly large in size, but that CDS activities are
7 All stock and index returns are taken from Thompson Refuters’ Datastream service; for more information
see http://online.thomsonreuters.com/datastream/
8 Non-U.S. banks enter our sample since they have to report any CDS activities of their U.S. subsidiaries.
Note that to the extent banks do not have integrated risk management systems and/or CDS activities are
not correlated within the bank, this will bias our estimations against finding an effect of CDS trading.
9 Minton et al. (2009) find that up to 2003 only 19 large banks used CDS. The differences arise, first, because
some banks started trading after 2003, and second, because we also consider smaller banks.
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on average larger.10 The average (daily) equity returns for each set of banks during
the respective sample periods are around 0.024% and 0.025%, respectively. Figures
2.A.1 and 2.A.2 show the distribution of the CLO and CDS starting dates, respectively.
We can see that these dates are well distributed over the entire period, thus creating
sufficient time-variation.
We will estimate the relationship between CRT activities and a bank’s beta using an
augmented CAPM model. For this we use the following regression equation






permRM,t + εi,t. (2.1)
In equation (2.1), αi is the bank fixed effect and Ri,t and RM,t are excess returns over
the risk-free rate for bank i and the market portfolio, respectively. The market return
is measured by the MSCI World index, as the dataset contains worldwide banks. Both
individual bank stock returns and index returns are translated into U.S. Dollars11. We
use the 3-month US Treasury Bill rate as a proxy for the risk-free return.
Then, Dabn is a dummy variable which takes the value of one 20 days before to 20
days after the event date. It is intended to measure any abnormal return associated
with the CRT event. For the CLO banks, the event date is the day of the first issuance
of a CLO. For the CDS banks, we only know the quarter in which CDS trading started.
We hence take the event date to be the middle of that quarter. Dtemp is a dummy
which is equal to 1 in the following 80 days after the event window. This dummy
will be used to measure any temporary mean effect of CRT. Dperm is a dummy to
measure the permanent beta effect, which takes a value of 1 after the end of the event
window until the end of the sample period. This dummy will be used to measure
the permanent mean effect of CRT. The variables of interest in the regression are the
10 For CLOs, size refers to the total size of the CLO, which does not have to equal the amount shed due to
tranche retention by the bank.
11 For this, we have downloaded the returns in U$ format from Datastream. We have also estimated
our model using returns in local currency, which yielded very similar results. For the currency
conversion of MSCI indices, see http://www.mscibarra.com/eqb/methodology/meth_docs/MSCI_May10_
IndexCalcMethodology.pdf
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coefficients on the interaction terms DtempRM,t and DpermRM,t, which will measure
the change in a bank’s beta in the 80 days after the event window (temporary effect)
and in the total period after the event window (permanent effect), respectively. Note
that these dummies are overlapping: the temporary effect will measure the beta effect
over and above the permanent effect.
2.3 results
The estimation results are presented in Table 2.A.2 (Panel A for CLO banks and Panel
B for CDS banks). Column 1 contains the results for the baseline model from equation
(2.1). Reported significance levels are based on panel-corrected standard errors. In
both datasets all the relevant variables are significant, except for the abnormal return
captured by coefficient δ. Furthermore, in both datasets the equity returns of banks
quite closely follow the market with a beta of 0.84 for CLO and a beta of 0.95 for CDS.
The fact that there is no abnormal return associated with the start of CRT activities is
interesting, as it suggests that the market does not expect any efficiency gains to be
associated with these activities.
The beta effect can be seen from the coefficients on the interaction terms (labeled
“Temporary β effect” and “Permanent β effect” respectively). For both CLO and CDS
banks we find a strong positive permanent beta effect: for CLO banks the beta increases
by 0.21,12 while for CDS banks it increases by 0.06. For CLO banks, however, there is
a negative temporary beta effect of -0.40. Since the dummy periods are overlapping,
this indicates that following a CLO the bank beta initially declines by -0.19 (=0.21-0.40),
after which it goes up permanently. For CDS banks we have a positive temporary effect
of 0.18 on top of the 0.06 from the permanent effect.
The initial reduction in beta associated with CLOs can be explained by the fact that
a (true sale) CLO removes loans from a bank’s balance sheet, thus lowering bank risk.
Only when the bank reacts to this, for example by extending new loans, bank risk may
increase later on. This is not the case for CDS, since banks may either buy or sell risk
12 If we constrain the analysis to European banks, this coefficient drops to 0.04. This is consistent with the
findings by Hänsel and Krahnen (2007) who obtain a weak effect of CLOs on bank betas using a sample
of European CLOs.
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using CDS. In fact, the additional temporary CDS effect suggests that banks take on
additional risk at the onset of CDS trading. This is consistent with the fact that the
accumulated amount of protection selling in the Call Reports available to us is higher
than the amount of protection buying.
In column 2 we report results for the baseline model without the temporary effect.
This is in order to make sure that our results are not influenced by the overlap of
the temporary and permanent dummy. The coefficients for the permanent effect are
basically unchanged and are still significant. The beta effect decreases for CLO banks
and increases for CDS banks, consistent with a negative temporary effect for CLO and
a positive temporary effect for CDS banks; these are now captured by the permanent
effect. In column 3 we report results from the baseline model where additionally the
excess return of the banking sector over the market return, RB − RM, is included. The
bank sector return RB is the return on the MSCI World Commercial Bank index in
excess of the risk-free rate. The results show that the banking sector is closely followed
by the CLO banks (β4 = 0.96), but less so for the CDS banks (β4 = 0.67). More
importantly, we observe that the results for the beta effects do not change much.
Taken together, the size of the estimated coefficients suggests that CRT affects banks
substantially, or is at least perceived to do so by the market. Very likely this is not
exclusively due to changes banks implement at the time of CRT itself. Rather, the
market will also perceive future changes in bank behavior and discount these to the
present period. The economic significance of our results is also consistent with the
general experience in the crisis of 2008-2009, which suggested that the impact of CRT
on bank risk indeed was large. It should furthermore be noted that our estimates are
consistent with other studies which also find large effects of CRT. For example, Goderis
et al. (2007) find that after the issuance of its first CLO a bank increases its target loan
level by 50%.
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2.3.1 Robustness checks
In this section we carry out various robustness checks for our main result, which is
that there is a significant and strong permanent beta effect related to the introduction
of CRT activities.
A first alternative explanation of our results is that the increase in betas is not specific
to CRT-banks. Instead, banks overall may have experienced an increase in their betas,
regardless of whether they undertake CRT activities or not. For this we study the betas
of banks which are similar to our CRT banks. More specifically, we match each CRT
bank with its closest bank in its jurisdiction (North America, Europe, Asia or Oceania)
in terms of asset size at the beginning of the sample. We then replace the returns of our
CRT banks with those from the matching banks and run again the baseline regression
from equation (2.1).
The results from this exercise are contained in Table 2.A.3. As can be seen, there is a
negative permanent effect for the set of banks matched to our CLO banks, while there
is no significant effect at all for the matching CDS banks. The negative effect for CLO
banks is interesting as it suggests that CRT might have competitive effects: expansion
of risk-taking at CLO banks may result in lower lending market share for non-CLO
banks. Since CLO-banks are very large banks this is not implausible, as a change in
their activities could indeed affect the remaining banks. An alternative interpretation is
that CRT is driven by differences in risk appetites: while risk-loving banks undertake
CLOs and see their beta increase, risk-averse banks shy away from lending and see
their beta decrease.
Besides matched banks, we also study whether there is a general trend towards
higher betas in the banking sector during our sample period. We estimate the beta of
the MSCI World Bank index with respect to the world market index in 2-year inter-
vals. The results of this regression indicate that, apart from the first 2-year period, the
bank sector’s beta with respect to the market has been fairly stable; if anything, it has
decreased. There is thus no general upwards trend in betas throughout the banking
sector. This suggests that CRT banks increased their risk but that this was offset by
non-CRT banks.
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A related concern is that CRT-banks are somehow different from other banks and
that they are characterized by a general increase in their risk over time (unrelated to
CRT activities). Since our permanent CRT-dummies increase from zero to one over
the sample period for all banks, this could also result in a significant estimation of
the permanent dummy. To address this concern we allow for a trend in betas in our
baseline model. Results can be found in the last column of Table 2.A.2. The trend
is insignificant and both temporary and permanent effects are virtually unchanged.
In addition, we have also checked robustness to a potentially non-linear trend by
including yearly-beta effects (interacting RM,t with year dummies). Again, there are
no noteworthy changes in the results. Finally, we have carried out a Monte-Carlo
simulation to check robustness. For this we have simulated stock returns under the
assumption of a linear trend in bank betas, using bank-specific variances estimated
from our sample. Performing our regression analysis with these simulated returns
shows that temporary and permanent beta effects are on average insignificant. Fur-
thermore, the proportion of significant coefficients is close to the chosen significance
level (i.e. 5% is significant at the 5% level), further corroborating the robustness of our
results. More details can be found in section 2.A.3.
Another interesting question is whether our results are driven by a specific subgroup
of banks, or whether they seem to apply to banks undertaking CRT more generally. To
test this we split our sample according to various criteria and re-estimate the baseline
model for each subsample. Results are contained in Table 2.A.4, which only reports
the coefficients and significance of the permanent beta effect as we focus on this result.
This table first reports regression results for a breakdown by region, contained in
row 1. We separate into two regions, namely the United States and the rest of the world
(EU, Asia and Oceania). This exercise shows that our result holds quite generally:
apart from the CDS banks in the US, we find that a permanent beta increase ensues.
An interesting result is that the change for US CLO banks is quite large, possibly
reflecting the large role securitization plays in US markets.
Then, we report regression results for a breakdown by asset size (row 2 in the table).
For this we split the sample in three groups depending on asset size and run regres-
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sions for each group. A clear picture emerges. We find that regardless of the source
of CRT, the permanent effect increases with asset size: the group of large banks has a
coefficient larger than the middle group, which in turn is larger than the small banks
(for which coefficients are even insignificant). This is plausible as large banks dominate
securitization and derivatives markets. Hence, we would expect the impact for these
banks to be more pronounced.
Third, we split by Return on Assets (ROA, the third row in the table). We find
that for each of the six subgroups of banks CRT significantly increases betas, except
for the high ROA group of CDS banks. For these banks there is a negative beta effect.
Comparing the different groups one can see that the beta-effect is quite uniform across
ROA groups, apart from the last column. The negative coefficient for the banks with
the highest ROA may reflect that these banks have high franchise values to protect and
use CDS to protect against defaults on their portfolios rather than to source new risks.
Fourth, we do a breakdown by the loan-to-asset ratio of banks (fourth row). The
permanent effect comes out significantly in five out of the six groups, with the only
exception being the intermediate group of CDS banks. We see that the effect is the
strongest for the banks with the largest and smallest loan ratio. This suggests that the
effect does not seem to rely on the specific lending business model of the bank.
Fifth, we break down by past asset growth. The permanent effect is significant and
positive for four of the six subgroups. For CLO banks with intermediate asset growth
there is no significant effect, while for the fastest growing CDS banks there is a negative
effect that is significant. This is surprising to the extent that one would expect fast-
growing banks to become also more risky. A possible explanation, however, is that
these banks had already taken a lot of risk in the past, hence starting out with a high
beta. They may then have in fact used securitization to stabilize their balance-sheet
and to off-load risk.
Sixth, moving to the liability side we break down by the ratio of deposit and short-
term funding to total assets (a measure of fragility of bank funding). We find a signif-
icant and positive beta effect for four of the subgroups. The exceptions here are the
group of CLO banks with a low fragile funding ratio, and those CDS banks that have
a high share of fragile funding. For these groups there is no significant effect. Compar-
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ing the various coefficients, no clear picture emerges for how liability structure affects
the permanent effect.
We can thus conclude that our results are not driven by a specific group of banks
and seem to hold quite generally for banks undertaking CRT.
Then, we carry out some final robustness checks. First, plausible variations in the
length of the event window do not influence the beta effect much (at most 0.01 for
both the temporary and the permanent effect). For the CDS data, we also change the
position of the event window from centered at the middle of the quarter to either the
beginning or the end of the quarter. This does not affect the results noticeably. Second,
changing the captured period of the temporary dummy does not have a significant
effect on the coefficients either. Finally, we also control for the presence of outliers
in our stock return data. For this we winsorize the banks’ equity returns at 1% and
2.5% on each side. This does not yield any different results: the permanent effect is
virtually unchanged, while the temporary effect changes by only 0.01. Both effects
remain significant.
2.4 beta decomposition
We will now analyze the source of the change in the banks’ betas. For this we decom-
pose a beta into a variance and a correlation component, and analyze which part is
responsible for the increase in banks’ betas.





where covi,M is the covariance of the stock with the market return and σ2M is the
variance of the market. Using that the correlation coefficient between the stock and the
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This equation shows that the beta is the product of a bank’s correlation with the market
and its standard deviation relative to that of the market (the relative standard devia-
tion). A change in the beta may thus be triggered by a change in either component.
We next estimate whether CRT has led to a change in bank correlations. To this end
we normalize the share price and market returns by using their respective standard
deviations. By doing this, we obtain a series with a variance of one. From equation (2.4)
we then have that the estimated regression coefficient of these transformed returns
equals the correlation of the original series, since the relative standard deviation equals
one.
This normalization can be implemented in the baseline model in the following way,
where a tilde represents a transformed series:
R̃i,t = αi + ρ1iR̃M,i,t + δiD
abn + ρ2D
temp + ρtemp3 D
tempR̃M,i,t
+ ρ4D
perm + ρperm5 D
permR̃M,i,t + εi,t, (2.5)
where
R̃i,t =
Ri,t/σi,t<ti if t < ti
Ri,t/σi,t>ti if t > ti
and R̃M,i,t =
RM,i,t/σM,t<ti if t < ti
RM,i,t/σM,t>ti if t > ti
(2.6)
and ti denotes the event date. Note that in the computation of the normalized
variables we allow standard deviations to differ before and after the event date. Note
also that R̃M,i,t is now bank-specific because the variance correction depends on the
event date.
Table 2.A.5 contains the estimation results, in the same way as Table 2.A.2. For ease
of comparison we focus on the baseline model without the temporary effect (column
2). It can be seen that either method of CRT is associated with a significant permanent
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increase in the correlation: the respective coefficients are 0.22 for CLO banks and 0.19
for CDS banks. From this we can conclude that the increase in beta is at least partly
driven by an increase in correlations among banks.
Finally, we ask the question of how much of the increase in the beta is due to the
correlation effect (a change in ρi,M) and how much due to the variance of banks
relative to the market (a change in σiσM ). For this we derive an expression for the
change in the relative variance. Denoting with superscripts 0 and 1 the time before
and after the event date, and with ∆ the change in a variable, we can express the beta
after CRT as follows: β1 = β0 + ∆β. Using that β1 = ρ1i,M
σ1i
σ1M
= (ρ0i,M + ∆ρi,M)
σ1i
σ1M
























From this equation we can compute the change in the relative variance. We do this
using the estimated coefficients for the market return and for the permanent effect
in column 1 of both panels of Table 2.A.2 as estimates of β0 and ∆β, and the corre-
sponding coefficients in Table 2.A.5 as estimates for ρ0i,M and ∆ρi,M. We find that the
relative variance for both set of banks declined on average: for CLO banks we have




This implies that the beta increase is exclusively driven by an increase in bank cor-
relations. The change in the relative variance even had an offsetting effect on betas.
2.5 conclusion
In this paper we have analyzed the relationship between CRT activities at banks and
their riskiness as perceived by the market. We have found that the market considers
CRT banks to be substantially riskier: banks which issue their first CLO experience an
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increase in their beta by 0.21, while banks which start trading in CDS see their beta rise
by 0.06. This difference can be explained by the fact that CLOs can take loans off the
balance sheet, while CDS do not. Interestingly, we also found that the increase in the
beta is due to a higher correlation between banks and not due to higher bank volatility.
In other words: while banks individually look less risky (since their volatility declines),
they paradoxically pose more risk (since their correlation and beta increases).
This has important implications for an effective regulation of these institutions. It
highlights the need to regulate institutions not only according to their individual risk,
but also according to their contribution to systemic risk. Another interesting implica-
tion of our results is that the market seems to have been aware of the greater risk these
banks are posing. This is because the banks experienced a substantial increase in their
beta well before the onset of the crisis. Together with the failure of traditional risk
measures to spot the higher systemic risk at CRT banks, our results warrant a greater




Table 2.A.1: Descriptive statistics for the CLO and CDS datasets
Panel A: CLO Banks
Transaction Amount Bank Equity Return
(in thousands of US $) (daily, in %)
Mean 1,203,354 0.0240
Median 539,000 -0.0047
Std. Deviation 1,386,848 2.3709
Minimum 10,000 -19.9815
Maximum 5,500,000 21.3601
Panel B: CDS Banks
Transaction Amount Equity Return
(in thousands of US $) (daily, in %)
Mean 4,641,339 0.0246
Median 104,881 -0.0052
Std. Deviation 19,901,444 2.0691
Minimum 7 -40.5592
Maximum 123,851,000 40.5345
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Table 2.A.2: Beta estimation results
Panel A: CLO Banks
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Market β 0.8421*** 0.8420*** 0.8492*** 0.9703***





Abnormal Return -0.0006 -0.0006 -0.0006 -0.0005
(-0.88) (-0.90) (-0.89) (-0.73)
Temporary Mean Effect -0.0006 -0.0004 -0.0007
(-1.22) (-0.74) (-1.51)
Temporary β Effect -0.3977*** -0.4171*** -0.4035***
(-6.25) (-6.61) (-6.34)
Permanent Mean Effect 0.0002 0.0002 -0.0001 0.0004
(0.57) (0.45) (-0.15) (1.16)
Permanent β Effect 0.2136*** 0.1930*** 0.2370*** 0.2389***
(5.53) (5.01) (6.35) (6.84)
Bank Sector Excess Return 0.9641***
(19.44)
Observations 68565 68565 68565 68565
R2 0.09 0.09 0.12 0.09
Number of banks 35 35 35 35
The dependent variable is the daily individual bank stock return in excess of the risk-free rate. The regression
coefficients in column (1) are as in equation (2.1). Column (2) reflects the exclusion of the temporary effect, as
in the text. Column (3) adds the bank sector excess return to the baseline model. Column (4), finally, reports
the baseline model augmented with a time trend. Z-statistics from PCSE are reported in brackets. ***, ** and *
denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.
2.A appendix 27
Panel B: CDS Banks
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Market β 0.9453*** 0.9452*** 0.9626*** 1.0100***





Abnormal Return -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000
(-0.01) (-0.06) (-0.01) (-0.00)
Temporary Mean Effect -0.0004 -0.0001 -0.0004
(-0.91) (-0.33) (-0.96)
Temporary β Effect 0.1837*** 0.2005*** 0.1733***
(3.30) (3.69) (3.17)
Permanent Mean Effect 0.0002 0.0002 -0.0001 0.0002
(0.67) (0.58) (-0.17) (0.83)
Permanent β Effect 0.0595** 0.0694*** 0.0656*** 0.0748***
(2.56) (3.07) (2.92) (4.10)
Bank Sector Excess Return 0.6742***
(16.66)
Observations 77167 77167 77167 77167
R2 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.13
Number of banks 38 38 38 38
The dependent variable is the daily individual bank stock return in excess of the risk-free rate. The regression
coefficients in column (1) are as in equation (2.1). Column (2) reflects the exclusion of the temporary effect, as
in the text. Column (3) adds the bank sector excess return to the baseline model. Column (4), finally, reports
the baseline model augmented with a time trend. Z-statistics from PCSE are reported in brackets. ***, ** and *
denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.
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Table 2.A.3: Matching with banks not using CRT
CLO CDS
Market β 1.1231*** 0.9744***
(28.09) (25.34)
Abnormal Return -0.0004 -0.0009
(-0.57) (-0.94)
Temporary Mean Effect 0.0001 -0.0001
(0.25) (-0.10)
Temporary β Effect -0.0045 0.0263
(-0.07) (0.36)
Permanent Mean Effect 0.0002 0.0004
(0.57) (1.05)




Number of banks 35 38
The dependent variable is the daily individual bank stock return in ex-
cess of the risk-free rate for banks not engaging in CRT. The regression
coefficients are as in equation (2.1). Z-statistics from PCSE are reported





US EU/Asia/Oceania US EU/Asia/Oceania
Region 0.5856*** 0.1206*** -0.0282 0.2989***
(10.72) (2.81) (-1.02) (7.79)
Small Medium Large Small Medium Large
Total Assets 0.0592 0.2129*** 0.5616*** -0.0168 0.0802*** 0.2785***
(0.75) (4.67) (6.17) (-0.48) (2.71) (6.84)
ROA 0.1960** 0.1458** 0.1903*** 0.3889*** 0.3849*** -0.1347***
(2.47) (2.46) (4.23) (9.94) (8.95) (-4.35)
Loans/Assets 0.2031*** 0.0847* 0.3039*** 0.0876*** 0.0507 0.3575***
(3.26) (1.83) (4.37) (2.77) (1.55) (8.08)
Past Asset Growth 0.3408*** 0.0380 0.6051*** 0.1062*** 0.3274*** -0.1662***
(4.10) (0.75) (6.47) (3.24) (7.66) (-3.41)
(Dep&ST)/Assets 0.0773 0.0783** 0.5827*** 0.1309*** 0.2060*** -0.0129
(0.90) (2.29) (10.09) (3.40) (6.63) (-0.43)
The regression analysis performed is the one from equation (2.1). For ease of exposition we only report our main
variable of interest, namely the permanent β effect. Z-statistics from PCSE are reported in brackets. ***, ** and *
denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.
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Table 2.A.5: Correlation estimation results
Panel A: CLO Banks
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Market ρ 0.1635*** 0.1634*** 0.1460*** 0.1111***





Abnormal Return -0.0151 -0.0160 -0.0268 -0.0172
(-0.56) (-0.59) (-1.00) (-0.64)
Temporary Mean Effect -0.0255 -0.0152 -0.0244
(-1.20) (-0.74) (-1.20)
Temporary ρ Effect -0.1000*** -0.1072*** -0.0996***
(-4.52) (-4.87) (-4.50)
Permanent Mean Effect 0.0293* 0.0268 0.0113 0.0257*
(1.65) (1.58) (0.68) (1.70)
Permanent ρ Effect 0.2250*** 0.2202*** 0.2520*** 0.1906***
(20.06) (19.80) (23.71) (20.70)
Bank Sector ρ 0.1504***
(19.22)
Observations 68565 68565 68565 68565
R2 0.100 0.100 0.123 0.101
Number of banks 35 35 35 35
The dependent variable is the daily individual bank stock return, in excess of the risk free rate
and adjusted according to equation (6). The regression coefficients in column (1) are as in equation
(2.5). Column (2) reflects the exclusion of the temporary effect, as in the text. Column (3) adds the
bank sector excess return, adjusted in the same manner as the market return, to the baseline model.
Column (4), finally, reports the baseline model augmented with a time trend. Z-statistics from PCSE
are reported in brackets. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.
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Panel B: CDS Banks
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Market ρ 0.2671*** 0.2671*** 0.2673*** 0.1793***





Abnormal Return 0.0138 0.0146 0.0150 0.0085
(0.54) (0.57) (0.60) (0.34)
Temporary Mean Effect -0.0237 -0.0105 -0.0194
(-1.24) (-0.56) (-1.04)
Temporary ρ Effect -0.1094*** -0.1151*** -0.0833***
(-7.03) (-7.61) (-5.47)
Permanent Mean Effect 0.0261* 0.0236 0.0071 0.0185
(1.66) (1.57) (0.48) (1.44)
Permanent ρ Effect 0.1964*** 0.1852*** 0.2057*** 0.1513***
(21.54) (21.32) (23.45) (20.79)
Bank Sector ρ 0.1277***
(17.69)
Observations 77167 77167 77167 77167
R2 0.148 0.148 0.165 0.150
Number of banks 38 38 38 38
The dependent variable is the daily individual bank stock return, in excess of the risk free rate
and adjusted according to equation (6). The regression coefficients in column (1) are as in equation
(2.5). Column (2) reflects the exclusion of the temporary effect, as in the text. Column (3) adds the
bank sector excess return, adjusted in the same manner as the market return, to the baseline model.
Column (4), finally, reports the baseline model augmented with a time trend. Z-statistics from PCSE
are reported in brackets. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.
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2.a.2 Figures
Figure 2.A.1: Distribution of first CLO issuances
Figure 2.A.2: Distribution of first CDS engagements
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2.a.3 Monte-Carlo simulations
We first perform a CAPM regression augmented with a trend to obtain an idea about
reasonable coefficients that can be used for the data generation process in the simula-
tions. In particular we run a regression of the form
Ri,t = β0T + (β1 +β2 ∗ T)RM,t + εi,t
where T represents a time trend. Based on the results we have decided to to use the
following parameters for the simulations: β0 = 0 (no trend in returns), β1 = 1, β2 =
0.0001 (this beta time trend implies an increase in betas of 0.2 over the sample period).
The data generating process for the MC simulations then looks as follows:
R̃i,t = (1+ 0.0001 ∗ T)RM,t + ηi,t
where R̃i,t are the generated individual stock returns. ηi,t is an error term that is
normally distributed with mean 0 and standard deviation σi, i.e. ηi,t ∼ N(0,σi). The
σi are computed from the sample variance of our original data and are bank-specific.
After simulating the data, we perform our panel fixed effects estimation with PCSE.
We stopped after 1000 runs since the results were quite clear. Table 2.A.6 reports the
mean of the coefficients and z-statistics, together with the fraction of significant coeffi-
cients. We first find that our parameters indicating presence of a β change are insignif-
icant on average. Second we find that the frequency of significant dummies is close to
the assumed significance level. For example, the percentages of permanent dummies
that are significant at the 5% level are 4.5% and 10% for CLOs and CDS, respectively.
The MC simulation thus confirms the validity of our empirical specification.
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Table 2.A.6: Monte Carlo results
Panel A: CLO Banks
Mean Coefficient Fraction significant Fraction significant
(Z-statistic) (at 1 % level) (at 5 % level)
Market β 1.00213*** 1.000 1.000
(16.66198)
Mean Trend -0.00000 0.009 0.064
(-0.04674)
β Trend 0.00010** 0.347 0.604
(2.22159)
Abnormal Return -0.00003 0.008 0.051
(-0.03952)
Temporary Mean Effect -0.00001 0.012 0.058
(-0.02791)
Temporary β Effect 0.00004 0.009 0.049
(0.00029)
Permanent Mean Effect 0.00001 0.013 0.055
(0.04674)
Permanent β effect -0.00042 0.007 0.045
(-0.01211)
The regressors are as defined in the paper. The second and third columns of each panel denote the number of signifi-
cant coefficients as a fraction of the number of simulations. Z-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.
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Panel B: CDS Banks
Mean Coefficient Fraction significant Fraction significant
(Z-statistic) (at 1 % level) (at 5 % level)
Market β 0.70834*** 1.000 1.000
(23.29417)
Mean Trend 0.00000 0.010 0.049
(0.07350)
β Trend 0.00007*** 0.449 0.687
(2.44186)
Abnormal Return 0.00008 0.011 0.055
(0.16819)
Temporary Mean Effect 0.00004 0.006 0.041
(0.11380)
Temporary β Effect -0.01172 0.002 0.047
(-0.21577)
Permanent Mean Effect -0.00002 0.010 0.059
(-0.12221)
Permanent β effect 0.01262 0.022 0.103
(0.69868)
The regressors are as defined in the paper. The second and third columns of each panel denote the number of signifi-
cant coefficients as a fraction of the number of simulations. Z-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.

3
C O M P L E M E N T I N G B A G E H O T: I L L I Q U I D I T Y A N D I N S O LV E N C Y
R E S O L U T I O N
This chapter is based on Eijffinger and Nijskens (2011).
3.1 introduction
The financial crisis of 2008 and 2009 has shown the inability of banking regulation
and supervision to cope with large shocks to the financial system. To begin with,
central banks around the world have had to provide substantial amounts of liquidity to
alleviate liquidity shortages, even to banks that were in fact insolvent. This goes against
the principle advocated by Bagehot (1873): insolvent banks should not be provided
with liquidity. However, as these banks constituted a risk for the financial system as a
whole, central banks had to save them.
In addition to the liquidity provision by central banks, governments around the
world have constructed very large rescue packages consisting of capital injections into
banks, all-out nationalizations, explicit guarantees on bank lending and purchases of
troubled assets. During 2009, total resources committed in these packages amounted
to e5 trillion or 18.8% of GDP for 11 large western countries1, whereas actual outlays
were e2 trillion (Panetta et al., 2009) at that time. For some smaller countries, like
the Netherlands, Denmark or Belgium, recapitalisation efforts and debt guarantees
even amounted to around 30% of GDP (Levy and Schich, 2010). Nevertheless, this
large-scale intervention has turned out to be absolutely necessary to restore confidence
and stability.
1 Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Spain, Switzerland, the United King-
dom and the United States.
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Naturally, the academic literature on the Lender of Last Resort (LLR) and bank
bailouts has increased tremendously after these events. Traditionally this literature
has focused on the principle proposed by Bagehot (1873): a central bank acting as a
Lender of Last Resort should provide liquidity freely to illiquid (but solvent) banks,
against good collateral and at a penalty rate2.
A classic critique of this principle is that with modern, well-functioning financial
markets a Lender of Last Resort is not necessary anymore: a solvent bank in need of
liquidity can go to the interbank market (Goodfriend and King, 1988; Kaufman, 1991).
However, the recent financial crisis showed that in bad times, the interbank market
may stop functioning. This may happen because of bad asset quality (Brunnermeier
and Pedersen, 2009), aggregate uncertainty about fundamentals (Holmstrom and Ti-
role, 1998) and the resulting inability of market participants to distinguish liquidity
from solvency problems. These may lead to coordination failures (Rochet and Vives,
2004; Freixas et al., 2004). As Rochet and Vives (2004) find, coordination failures cause
interbank market participants to stop lending to a bank when its fundamentals fall
below a certain threshold, although the bank may still be solvent. This suggests a role
for the CB as an LLR, providing liquidity to increase confidence of financial markets.
However, regulators also face similar problems in determining whether they should
assist a bank or not (Goodhart, 1988), since banks are often better informed about
the quality of their assets than regulators are. Because of the inability to discriminate
between liquidity and solvency problems, banks may be inefficiently closed or left
open (Boot and Thakor, 1993; Rochet, 2004). Freixas et al. (2004) thoroughly examine
this issue, assuming that the Central Bank (CB) cannot determine ex ante whether the
bank is only illiquid or also insolvent. Their results show that a CB providing LLR
support is optimal when insolvent banks are not detected by the market (Rochet and
Vives, 2004), it is costly for banks to screen borrowers, and interbank market spreads
are high. This resembles crisis episodes with inefficient market discipline, such as the
recent financial crisis.
2 A good overview of two decades of research on LLR and closure policy has been provided by Freixas
and Parigi (2008).
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Also, moral hazard by the bank may ensue: as it is provided with liquidity it can
take on more risk than it would otherwise do. Bagehot’s remedy for this is to levy
a penalty rate. However, in most financial crises this has not been the case. During
the recent financial crisis, for instance, the Fed and the ECB lent freely, but not at a
penalty rate. Indeed, several authors have found that penalty rates may even increase
moral hazard. Repullo (2005), for instance, finds that the existence of a lender of last
resort in itself does not create moral hazard, but the introduction of a penalty rate does.
More recently, Castiglionesi and Wagner (2011) find that a bank that receives liquidity
at a penalty rate exerts less effort to avoid insolvency, as the cost difference between
illiquidity and insolvency will be lower.
Finally, the literature has recently considered the effect of systemic shocks on LLR
practices. Rochet (2004), for instance, analyzes the optimal LLR policy in the presence
of macroeconomic shocks. Banks with a shock exposure above a certain threshold
are perceived as too risky and should not receive liquidity assistance. However,
this threshold rule is time inconsistent, leading to ex post regulatory forbearance.
More recently, Acharya and Yorulmazer (2007, 2008) have considered the correlation
between banks’ investments and its effect on LLR policy. Ex ante, the CB would want
to let correlated banks fail to discipline them. It is, however, not able to credibly
commit to this policy: another time inconsistency problem.
We will, however, not study interactions between multiple banks but focus on the
interaction between this bank and multiple regulators. Furthermore, our analysis does
not focus explicitly on the recent system-wide financial crisis; it is a game between a
single bank and a regulator. Repullo (2000) studies this interaction in the context of
the lender of last resort function, while Kahn and Santos (2005) additionally consider
the authority to close the bank. In both models regulator’s choices are based on im-
perfectly observable information. Both analyses find that, to mitigate forbearance, the
CB should be the LLR in case of small shocks and the Deposit Insurance Fund (DIF)
should fulfil this role in case of large shocks.
We extend this idea to incorporate prompt corrective action (PCA), as recently
analyzed by Kocherlakota and Shim (2007) and Shim (2011). There is one authority
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who should decide, at a certain threshold level of liquidity problems, whether the
bank remains open or should be closed. In case it remains open, the closure authority
should provide capital or guarantees to warrant liquidity provision. This resembles
the recent crisis, in which fiscal authorities have provided capital or guarantees to
keep banks afloat. The analytical model in this paper will provide a framework
to perform a simultaneous analysis of liquidity provision and solvency assistance.
Furthermore, our analysis incorporates two principles regarding lender of last resort
practices. One is the abovementioned principle of Bagehot, stating that central banks
should only provide liquidity to solvent banks. The other, complementing Bagehot’s
doctrine, is the idea that bailout assistance (e.g. capital injections or loan guarantees)
should be made costly for banks (Eijffinger, 2008), as a punishment for threatening
financial stability.
The results of our analysis show that without any safety net, banks take excessive
risk and hoard too much liquidity relative to the social optimum. The introduction of
a central bank providing liquidity can decrease excessive liquidity hoarding, but also
leads to engagement in moral hazard by banks. To alleviate the moral hazard prob-
lem we extend the rescue measures to comprise also assistance by a fiscal authority,
which can be made costly for banks. Ultimately we find that the nature of this assis-
tance depends on the weight the fiscal authority attaches to the costs of bank failure.
Little concern for bank failure leads to a capital injection at a fixed premium. This
alleviates the moral hazard problem, while the bank also invests more in productive
assets. A fiscal authority that is very concerned about financial stability will demand a
share in bank equity claims. This also decreases moral hazard and leads to an increase
in investment. By providing solvency assistance at a premium, be it through debt or
equity assistance, the fiscal authorities can provide monitoring and investment incen-
tives to the bank. Knowing that it will receive this assistance (provided it monitors well
enough), the bank does not have to keep liquidity and can invest more in productive
assets. In the next section, we will introduce our analytical framework in an informal
way, before setting up our formal model.
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3.2 methodology
We model a bank that is systemically important by nature and thus generates negative
externalities if it would fail. This bank operates with given deposits (fully insured) and
capital (provided by the bank owner). The bank chooses its investment and monitor-
ing effort. The long term investment asset is risky, but productive. Its counterpart, a
storage technology or liquid reserve, is riskless and unproductive, but protects against
potential liquidity shocks3. Furthermore, monitoring of investments increases the prob-
ability of success, but reduces the profitability of investment.
Figure 3.1: Sequence of events
t = 0 t = 1 t = 2
Success
Small shock: No intervention
Failure
Success
Players choose Medium shock: Liquidity assistance
Failure
Success
Large shock: Capital assistance
(or closure) Failure
The sequence of events that follows the bank’s choices is depicted in Figure 3.1. As
follows from this figure, the return on investment realizes in the last stage of the
sequence (t = 2). If the bank fails here (due to a bad result), or at any earlier stage, it
will be taken over by the Deposit Insurance Fund (DIF) and the bank owner loses all
3 This can also be viewed as making use of existing credit lines, for example on the interbank market or at
the central bank.
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capital. The remaining assets of the bank will be used to paid off depositors, while the
DIF covers the rest. We assume that deposit insurance is provided exogenously.
It should be noted that the insurance of deposits generates moral hazard if it is
not fairly priced. As we assume the liability side of the bank to be fixed and deposit
insurance is exogenous, this may well be the case. However, we take this effect as
given and focus on the moral hazard that may be generated by liquidity and solvency
assistance, additional to the effect of deposit insurance, as described below.
At an intermediate stage (t = 1), the bank learns about its future return on the
long term asset; this is information private to the banker. In Figure 3.1 we can also
see that at this intermediate stage, the bank can suffer from a liquidity shock. This
liquidity shock leads to depositors withdrawing a fraction of their deposits (because
of an exogenous need for liquidity)4. When the shock is small, the bank can resolve it
with its own reserves. However, when the shock is of medium size, the bank cannot
cope with the liquidity shock on its own. As we have assumed there is no functioning
interbank market (we are in a crisis), the bank has to apply for emergency liquidity
at the Central Bank (CB). This CB performs two functions: it is the bank’s supervisor
and the Lender of Last Resort (LLR), in the manner advocated by Bagehot5. In its
capacity as a supervisor, the CB receives an imperfect signal on bank solvency (partly
revealing the banker’s private information). Through this signal the CB will get more
information on bank solvency, but is not able to tell whether the illiquid bank is
solvent or not. More details on the signal will be given in section 3.3. When acting
as LLR, the CB can use this signal as an input to minimize its own loss function. It
decides whether to assist the bank by weighting the expected benefits and costs of
providing emergency liquidity. As soon as the shock is too large to warrant a liquidity
injection, the CB will stop providing liquidity.
4 Taking the credit crisis as a reference point, this kind of liquidity shock is very similar to investors in
asset-backed securities selling their claims back to the bank. Banks were obliged to return the money,
which led to severe liquidity problems. We can see this as analogous to deposit withdrawals, be it by
retail depositors or wholesale investors (Rochet and Vives, 2004).
5 This CB can be seen as an institution with a more general mandate for supervision and macroprudential
policy, or financial stability.
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When the CB stops providing liquidity the Fiscal Authority (FA), who is the third
player in our model, will decide on the bank’s fate6 . This authority has bank resolution
powers, which the CB does not have. This means that the FA can close the bank or leave
it open; in the latter case it will have to inject capital to improve the bank’s solvency
position. This type of assistance by the FA resembles the bank-specific measures (such
as recapitalization, guarantees or nationalization) that many governments have taken
during the financial crisis. Note that we abstract from system-wide capital provision
efforts such as the Trouble Assets Relief Program (TARP) in the US; for a rigorous
analysis of the effect of these programmes see Bhattacharya and Nyborg (2010), Farhi
and Tirole (2012) or Philippon and Schnabl (2012).
However, as we have seen during the crisis, the involvement of government in res-
cuing banks has caused a lot of public indignation. To capture this phenomenon, we
assume that the FA can demand a premium return on its assistance. The FA can de-
mand two types of repayment. First, it can set an ex ante premium on its support; this
premium depends positively on the importance the FA attaches to preventing bank
failure. This can be interpreted as providing assistance in the form of senior debt or
guarantees. Second, it can demand a stake in period 2 bank value, effectively becoming
an equity claimant in the bank. Many government authorities have employed this form
of individual bank assistance during the financial crisis of 2008/2009, with national-
ization as a limit case (100% equity claim). Which of these two types of repayment is
chosen shall, as we will see in section 3.4, depend on the importance the FA attaches
to bank failure. To wrap up, Table 3.1 summarizes the players in our model and their
choice variables.
We analyze the interaction between these players as a game: the bank, choosing its
investment and monitoring, the CB that sets a LLR policy and the FA that decides
on solvency assistance are all acting strategically. Other approaches, e.g. by Philippon
and Schnabl (2012) and Bhattacharya and Nyborg (2010), employ mechanism design
to tackle regulatory questions. However, these studies do not consider liquidity and
6 One could ask why we do not consider the DIF as the authority providing solvency assistance. In the
United States this is common practice, with the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) being in
charge of bank resolution. However, in Europe this task often falls to the ministry of finance; this is the
situation we are treating.
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Table 3.1: Overview of players and their choices
Player Choices
Bank Investment & Monitoring
Central Bank LLR policy
Fiscal Capital injection and its
Authority return structure
solvency at the same time. Rather, they focus on the problem of debt overhang that
is more general in corporate finance, and a specific problem in banking. While they
answer a very interesting question (are equity injections, asset purchases or debt guar-
antees optimal?), this method is not very suitable in capturing strategic interaction
between banks and regulators.
Instead, our approach is closer to that of Repullo (2000, 2005) and Kahn and Santos
(2005), in which the CB sets a certain threshold for the liquidity shock, beyond which it
will not assist the bank anymore. To this game we add an authority (FA) that disposes
over a solvency instrument. The FA can be seen as representative of the Treasury or
Ministry of Finance, who address bank solvency problems. This resembles prompt
corrective action as in Kocherlakota and Shim (2007) and Shim (2011). However, unlike
in these analyses the FA is not maximizing social welfare. Instead, it is an independent
authority with a mandate to resolve problems threatening financial stability7.
Finally, we like to recall that we explicitly exclude both penalty rates (on liquidity)
and ambiguity in our model. As we have noted in section 3.1, penalty rates have
not been applied in recent financial crises, and certainly not in the most recent one.
Furthermore, several authors have argued that penalty rates can increase moral hazard
instead of reducing it, especially when banks are close to insolvency (Repullo, 2005;
Castiglionesi and Wagner, 2011).
The doctrine of “constructive ambiguity” states that a bank should face some
uncertainty about whether it will receive liquidity or not. This approach is analyzed
7 Although time inconsistency problems may be of concern to some, we have seen that several governments
(e.g. the Dutch one) have been tough in providing bailout assistance.
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by, among others, Freixas (1999), Goodhart and Huang (1999) and Cordella and
Levy-Yeyati (2003), with contrasting results. While Freixas (1999) finds that ambiguity
may have its merits in some cases (by reducing moral hazard), he also finds that it
can lead to a Too-Big-to-Fail (TBTF) policy. Goodhart and Huang (1999) advocate a
similar policy, but this is motivated by contagion concerns. Cordella and Levy-Yeyati
(2003) conclude that not following an ambiguity policy can lead to an increase in
bank charter value, compensating the possible moral hazard effect of having an LLR.
Furthermore, in many financial crises (including the most recent one) ambiguity has
not been applied. Every large or otherwise important financial institution has been
assisted by either the central bank, fiscal authorities or both8. Therefore, we abstract
from ambiguity. Let us now move to the formal specification of our model.
3.3 the model
We start this section with a brief summary of section 3.2. We consider an economy
with risk-neutral agents and three dates: t = 0, 1, 2. In this economy, there is one sys-
temically important bank that operates under limited liability and will choose how
much to invest in risky assets and how much liquid reserves to keep. Additionally, the
bank can choose to what extent it will monitor its risky investments, thereby affecting
the return structure of these assets. Furthermore, the economy also contains two regu-
latory agencies: a Central Bank (CB) fulfilling the role of Lender of Last Resort (LLR)
and a Fiscal Authority (FA) that, in case of a bank failure, has to decide on the failure
resolution procedure. This authority disposes over a solvency instrument that can be
used to increase the bank’s capital. In return, the FA will ask either a fixed premium
or an equity claim on bank value.
The bank starts at t = 0 with an exogenously given capital structure consisting of
equity and deposits. We normalize the size of the bank to one9, so we can denote the
share of capital with k and the share of deposits with 1− k. As we have mentioned,
8 A notable exception being Lehman Brothers.
9 Since we have assumed that there is only one bank and thus bank failure is costly for society, we may
abstract from letting bank size determine bank closure policy.
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deposits are fully insured, which means they are riskless, and thus yield a return of
one at t = 2. To abstract completely from deposit insurance issues, we assume that the
bank pays no deposit insurance premium. Equity and deposits can be invested in a
risky, illiquid asset or in liquid reserves. The share of reserves will be called l, which
provides a riskless return of one on the fraction l. This implies that the riskless interest
rate in our model is equal to zero. This definition leaves 1− l to be invested in the risky




R(p) with probability p
0 with probability 1− p,
where p ∈ [0, 1] is the success probability of investment, which increase with the efforts
of the bank to monitor this investment. The assumptions on R(p) are summarized
below.
Assumption 3.1: R ′(p) < 0, R ′′(p) 6 0, R(p) > 1 ∀ p ∈ [0, 1], R(1) + R ′(1) < 0.
These return assumptions are also used by Boot and Thakor (1993), Cordella and
Levy-Yeyati (2003) and Repullo (2005), and imply that there are decreasing returns
to monitoring of investments. They also allow us to analyze moral hazard in a con-
tinuous manner. Expected return on investments E(R̃) = pR(p) will be maximized at
p̂ ∈ (0, 1) where p̂ is defined by R(p̂) + p̂R ′(p̂) = 010. Furthermore, E(R̃) is greater than
one, and investments are illiquid since they cannot be sold before t = 2. Note, finally,
that the bank privately observes the realized return (0 or R(p)) on its investment at
t = 1. This information is, however, not verifiable and can thus not be conditioned
upon.
10 Note that, for p = 0, dpR(p)dp = R(0) > 0 and, for p = 1, R(1) + R
′(1) < 0. The second order condition for
a maximum is d
2pR(p)
dp2
= 2R ′(p) + pR ′′(p) < 0 for all p > 0. This suffices for an interior maximum at p̂.
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Given the above assumptions we can write bank value V at the end of period 2 as
follows:
V = (R(p) − 1)(1− l) + k. (3.1)
This leads to the following expression for expected bank value:
p[(R(p) − 1)(1− l) + k] + (1− p)Max[l− (1− k), 0]. (3.2)
The maximization operator follows from the assumption that the bank operates under
limited liability. However, as long as ∂V/∂l < 0 (which holds in equilibrium in section
3.4) it will never be the case that l > 1− k and we can safely ignore the second term
in expression (3.2). Furthermore, if the bank fails (with probability 1 − p) it will be
resolved by the DIF, as mentioned above.
3.3.1 A liquidity shock
At t = 1, a liquidity shock x occurs. This shock is independent from p and is uniformly
distributed on the interval (0, 1) with cumulative density F(x) = x and probability
density f(x) = 1. The size of the shock is public information when it occurs at t = 1.
Taking into account that we have two regulatory agencies, we can distinguish three
cases:
1. x 6 l1−k = x, in which the liquidity shock can be resolved using liquid reserves;
2. x < x 6 x, in which the bank is illiquid and will apply for emergency lending
at the LLR. x is a threshold that is determined by the Central Bank, as described
below; and
3. x < x, in which the solvency of the bank is insufficient to warrant LLR borrowing
and the fiscal authority will have to take a closure/continuation decision.
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In case 1, the shock is small and the bank can repay the withdrawn deposits using its
liquid reserves l. Note that we assume there is no interbank market; the bank’s only
liquidity comes from the amount of liquid reserves it has kept at t = 011.
In case 2, when x < x < x, the bank cannot finance the liquidity shortage by itself,
so it has to apply for emergency liquidity from the Central Bank (CB) at an amount
of x(1− k) − l. The CB will ask a repayment RCB = 1 (we assume no penalty rate) at
t = 2 and will only lend to solvent banks. This means it sets a threshold for x, called
x, above which it will not lend to the bank. We will elaborate on this in section 3.3.2.
In the third case, when x > x, the bank cannot borrow from the CB. The bank will
enter into a prompt corrective action programme by the fiscal authority (FA). The FA
assists the bank by providing capital to increase the solvency position of the bank:
its new capital ratio will become k+ kFA, where kFA denotes the share that the FA
contributes. As described in section 3.2, following bailout assistance the FA decides
upon the conditions on which this capital will be provided. As we will explain in the
next section, this decision depends on the importance the FA places on bank failure.
3.3.2 Regulator’s objectives
As stated above, we have assumed the existence of two regulatory authorities: a CB and
an FA. These authorities are given a mandate for financial stability by the government,
who explicitly delegates this responsibility to these authorities. Instead of focusing
on maximizing social welfare, both the CB and the FA will have a loss function that
they should minimize. This reflects common arrangements in the institutional design
of central banks, but also in that of financial supervisors and resolution authorities
(Mayes, 2009).
The CB has two roles in our model: it is the Lender of Last Resort (LLR), but also
the bank supervisor. In its role as LLR, it can observe the liquidity holdings l and
needs x(1− k) − l of a bank in distress, but not the amount of monitoring embodied
in p. However, it does obtain a private signal si ∈ {s0, si} about the realized return on
11 This assumption can be justified since we are focusing on crisis management. In the financial crisis the
interbank market nearly broke down (Allen et al., 2009; Diamond and Rajan, 2009). Massive intervention
by central banks seemed to be the only way to get it going again.
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the bank’s investments at t = 1; the signal is independent from p and x. Since it pro-
vides information about bank solvency the signal can be used to decide upon liquidity
assistance. Following Repullo (2005) the properties of this signal are as follows:




where Pr denotes a probability and q is the quality of supervisory information. The
solvency signal tells the CB whether the return at t = 2 is low (R0 = 0) or high
(R1 = R(p)), but does not transmit the actual value of the return R(p). To gauge the













pq+ (1− p)(1− q)
. (3.5)
When q = 12 , the signal is uninformative since Pr[R1|s0] = Pr[R1|s1] = p, and when
q = 1 the signal is completely informative since Pr[R1|s0] = 0 and Pr[R1|s1] = 1.
We assume that q > 12 , which leads to 0 < Pr[R1|s0] < p < Pr[R1|s1] < 1 for any
p < 1. As Repullo (2005) notes, we can thus call s0 and s1 the bad and the good signal
respectively.
In fulfilling its role of LLR, the CB will want to minimize the social cost of a bank’s
failure. This is reflected in the bankruptcy cost c, which may represent a breakdown
of e.g. payment systems, interbank lending or the provision of credit for productive
investment. The CB will therefore provide liquidity up to a certain threshold, which is
based on the available information on liquidity and solvency (the signal). This follows
from the generally accepted principle stated by Bagehot (1873): central banks should
not lend to banks that are both illiquid and insolvent. In determining is liquidity
provision threshold, the CB takes into account an expected cost of Pr[R0|si][αc+(x(1−
k) − l)] when it supports the bank with emergency liquidity. When it does not support
the bank, the CB incurs the certain loss αc. In these expressions, α is the weight the
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regulator attaches to the bankruptcy cost. This can be interpreted as the political or
reputational cost to the central bank and is assumed to be greater than zero12.
Comparing the two above expressions, Pr[R0|si][αc+ (x(1− k) − l)] 6 αc, we can
deduce two different thresholds for the CB at t = 1. These are denoted by xi, where i
can be 0 or 1 and we use the fact that Pr[R1|si] = 1− Pr[R0|si]:










Since we have assumed that q > 12 , it can be checked that x0 < x1. These thresholds
mean that the bank will apply for an amount of x(1 − k) − l and the CB will only
provide liquidity when (3.6) or (3.7) holds (depending on the realization of the
solvency signal). Above these thresholds, the certain cost of a bank failure at t = 1 is
greater than the expected cost of failure at t = 2.
In the case when x > xi, the FA will have to decide whether it closes the bank or
provides solvency assistance. It has access to the same information as the CB, namely
liquidity l and the solvency signal si. As stated above, the FA can assist the bank
by increasing the bank’s capital. The FA will provide this capital kFA,i to make sure
that the CB alleviates the bank’s liquidity problem completely; the size of the injection
depends on the realization of si. Due to this capital injection (which may also be seen
as a debt guarantee) the CB’s new thresholds, which we call xi, will thus become a
function of kFA,i:










12 α > 1 in Kahn and Santos (2005), but Repullo (2000) assumes α < 1 and Repullo (2005) assumes α = 1.
We will not yet make any assumptions other than α > 0. The same holds for β in the case of the fiscal
authority.
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and kFA,i will be such that x = x(kFA,i). This means that at t = 1, the FA injects capital
such that the CB’s threshold and the realization of the shock are equalized, such that
the CB is willing to assist the bank with liquidity.
However, the FA will also have to weigh the benefits of injecting capital against
the costs. When it assists the bank the FA demands a premium that depends on
the weight it places on bankruptcy cost, which is denoted by β. The FA’s premium
is denoted by rFA(β), with properties r ′FA(β) > 0 and rFA(0) = 0. Note that β
is of similar nature as the CB’s α, but it need not be equal to α. This reflects the
political relation between the CB and the FA; they may have different responsibili-
ties regarding financial stability. The net expected gains of providing capital depend
on si and can be written as Pr[R1|si]rFA(β)kFA,i(x) − Pr[R0|si](βc+ kFA,i(x)). When
it does not assist the bank, the FA will incur a certain cost βc. It follows that the
maximum amount of capital that the FA is willing to provide will be determined by
Pr[R1|si]rFA(β)kFA,i(x) − Pr[R0|si](βc+ kFA,i(x)) > −βc, or
kFA,0(x) 6 kFA,0 ≡
p(1− q)βc
(1− p)q− p(1− q)rFA(β)
for s0, (3.10)
kFA,1(x) 6 kFA,1 ≡
pqβc
(1− p)(1− q) − pqrFA(β)
for s1. (3.11)
Substituting the expressions in equations (3.10) and (3.11) into the new CB threshold














As we can see, this depends positively on β (since ∂kFA,i∂β > 0), which can be
interpreted as the weight the FA attaches to financial stability. Note, furthermore, that
kFA,0 and kFA,1 are only positive for a β such that (1− p)q− p(1− q)rFA(β) > 0 and
(1 − p)(1 − q) − pqrFA(β) > 0. This means it is only viable in case the FA attaches
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little importance to bank failure: β is low. It also leads to a subsidy on assistance: the
expected gain for the FA is negative. Finally, when β = 0 the threshold will revert to
xi and the FA will take no action.
What will happen in case the FA cares very much about bank failure, i.e. in case
β is high? We hypothesize that in this case the FA can demand an equity claim on
the bank’s value, in the form of a share gi of V at t = 2 in case of success. Again,
it will incur the bankruptcy cost βc and lose its investment kFA,i in case of failure.
However, when it does not provide assistance, it will incur the cost βc with certainty.
Furthermore, it again requires at least the premium rFA(β) on its investment. The
trade-off the FA makes is the same as in the case with low β; however, instead of
stipulating a maximum amount of capital it now sets a minimum repayment fraction
gi of V . This gi is such that the FA at least breaks even, comparing the expected loss




















We will assume that this will hold with equality in equilibrium, as the FA will just
need to break even to be willing to provide capital. Furthermore, as we have assumed
β is large, rFA(β)p(1−q)−(1−p)q > 0, rFA(β)pq−(1−p)(1−q) > 0 and thus gi > 0.
The first possibility of government assistance or bailout, where the FA injects debt,
is a stylized representation of the situation in which a bank is recapitalized or pro-
vided with guarantees on its borrowing, at a certain price that is set ex ante. The
second possibility, with a required period 2 return of gi, can be seen as the govern-
ment providing funds with a preferred equity claim, which is determined ex post. In
the extreme (gi = 1) this will lead to a nationalization of the bank. Note that this latter
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case is essentially the same as having solely a CB as LLR: in both cases, the bank will
get nothing when x > xi.
These measures have been used extensively in crisis management during the last 2
years. Of course, these measures have not been free for banks: regulators have set a
premium on the rates to be paid for access to these facilities, as the government has
taken over part of the risk from the bank. This premium is, for instance, represented
by gi, which contains the abovementioned rFA. Bailout assistance thus comes at a cost
for the bank owner.
A final remark on central bank and government budgets is in order. We assume that
the central bank has no explicit budget constraint, as it can create (virtually) unlimited
liquidity to cope with liquidity shocks. However, the FA (or government) cannot do
this. If it would have to raise funds ex ante through taxes, this would reduce produc-
tivity since banks are taxed. As we analyze a partial equilibrium situation, the funding
mechanism is not taken into account. Instead, we assume the existence of a capital
market on which the FA, being a creditworthy government, can borrow at the risk-free
rate. In other words: the funding structure of the FA is exogenous.
3.3.3 The bank’s objective
Taking the liquidity shock and the regulatory system into account, the bank owner will
maximize total bank value at t = 2. The choice variables for the bank owner are the
effort put into monitoring, embodied in the probability of success p, and the amount
of investment 1− l. The probability of success, which increases with monitoring effort
at t = 0, can be interpreted as the inverse of the amount of risk taken.
Using the properties of the liquidity shock, the solvency signal and the aforemen-
tioned conditions x and g set by the regulatory authorities, we can refine the bank’s
objective function. We assume that there is no time discounting. The bank owner will
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maximize its t = 2 payoff, denoted by Π2, under different regimes and different real-
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(1− q)
∫x0
0 pVdF(x) + q
∫x1
1 pVdF(x) when CB acts as LLR,
(1− q)
∫xmax0











pV − (1− q)
∫1
x0 pg0VdF(x) − q
∫1
x1 pg1VdF(x) when FA claims equity.
We can see that expected bank value is not only varying with p and l, but also with x,
x, kFA and g. This indicates that it depends on the choices made by the bank owner
as well as those made by the regulators. In the next section we will characterize this
interdependence.
3.4 liquidity or liquidation
To summarize the previous sections, we can systematically go through the sequence of
events. We let the bank simultaneously choose its risk p (determined by its monitoring
effort) and its portfolio of risky investments 1 − l at t = 0, taking into account the
possibility of liquidity shocks at t = 1 and responses by the CB and the FA. At t = 1,
the liquidity shock realizes and it is observable. If x 6 x, the bank pays depositors out
of its liquidity reserves. If x < x 6 x, the bank applies for liquidity and the CB will
provide it. Finally, if x > x, the CB is not willing to provide liquidity and the FA will
take action, leading to either a premium repayment by or an equity claim on the bank.
Finally, at t = 2 returns on 1− l realize and assistance has to be repaid.
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3.4.1 Social welfare maximization
As a benchmark, we first analyze the socially efficient solution to the problem of choos-
ing optimal investment and risk taking in our economy with one bank. In this case, a
social planner will choose risk, investment and the regulatory instruments such that
the social value of bank investments is maximized. This means that these choices also
incorporate the externalities from bank failure; this assumption will not hold in a pri-
vate bank setting.
We assume that for society as a whole, liquidity can be obtained at zero cost and is in
essence just a transfer of funds from t = 2 to t = 1 (when the investment has positive
NPV). Therefore, liquidity assistance will always be provided when it is necessary13.
The gains to society are the total profit on bank investments at t = 2 minus the poten-
tial bank failure costs. These costs are comprised of DIF costs and bankruptcy costs
c, and realize when the investment fails and the DIF has to pay depositors (1− k) − l.
The problem to solve is thus:
max
p,l
pV − pk− (1− p)((1− k) − l+ c). (3.16)
The first order conditions for (3.16) are:




1− pswR(psw) = 0, (3.18)
representing marginal benefits and costs of monitoring and liquidity, respectively. We
assume that the costs of failure are larger than the value of capital, so c− k > 0. Since
liquidity is costless for society as a whole, it should be optimal to invest all available
funds into the productive, risky asset and keep no reserves. This also means that the
two first order conditions do not lead to an interior solution, but to a corner solution
with zero liquidity:
13 This assumption serves to restrict our analysis to the game between banks and regulators, without con-
sidering aggregate liquidity problems. For analyses of this nature, see i.e. Holmstrom and Tirole (1998),
Diamond and Rajan (2005) or Allen et al. (2009)
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Proposition 3.1: it is socially optimal to invest all of the bank’s funds in the risky, productive
asset. As a consequence, monitoring effort will be chosen to maximize the expected return on
investment.
Proof: by contradiction. Suppose that condition (3.18) holds, which means that psw
is such that E(R̃) = 1. We have assumed that E(R̃) > 1 at its optimum p̂ (when
R(p̂) + p̂R ′(p̂) = 0) and that ∂
2E(R̃)
∂p2
< 0 ∀ p, so it must hold that psw < p̂. However,
this also means that R(psw) + pswR ′(psw) > 0, which contradicts condition (3.17).
Therefore, p has to increase toward p̂ until condition (3.17) holds (with psw > p̂ for
k < c). This means that condition (3.18) no longer holds: 1− pswR(psw) < 0 and thus
lsw = 0. 
The intuition behind this is that the marginal benefit of liquidity is less than its
opportunity cost (expected return on investment) and thus no liquid reserves will
be held. It is thus socially optimal to set lsw = 0 and invest all funds in the risky
asset; with this knowledge, monitoring effort (and thus psw) is chosen to maximize
the expected return on these investments. This allocation maximizes the social value
of banking, and reflects Bagehot’s most important notion: solvent banks will always
receive liquidity. As monitoring is chosen to maximize expected return, which is
positive, liquidity provision is always warranted. Therefore, it is optimal for the social
planner to solely focus on the bank’s solvency.
This follows the reasoning in, among others, Allen et al. (2009), who find that it is
optimal to invest in risky or productive assets as long as there are no aggregate liq-
uidity problems and idiosyncratic liquidity risks are covered. Since we assume that
obtaining liquidity is costly for society (as long as the investment is ex ante profitable)
it is optimal to invest nothing in liquid assets. Note that this is a special, partial equilib-
rium case of the analysis in Allen et al. (2009). More recently, Malherbe (2012) presents
a model in which there is abundant liquidity, and cash liquidity holdings are only
necessary to cope with an inability to trade in the interbank market (in fact, they even
exacerbate this problem). In our model there is no adverse selection in society as a
whole and liquidity is freely available, so it is not optimal to hold any liquidity.
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3.4.2 Bank optimization without regulation
Let us now consider the case of a private bank choosing an optimal portfolio, and
analyze whether it reaches the socially efficient allocation. We assume that there are
no regulatory authorities, such as a Lender of Last Resort or a fiscal authority, which
may provide assistance. There is also no possibility to go to the interbank market, as
mentioned above. The bank thus has to cope with liquidity shocks on its own, which
means that the bank fails if the sudden demand for liquidity is larger than the bank’s
liquid assets. In case of failure, the returns at t = 2 are zero, since effectively g = 1




and the bank maximizes this by choosing investment 1− l and monitoring p, which
leads us to the following result.
Proposition 3.2: The bank monitors less than is socially optimal (it engages in moral hazard),
but also invests less in productive assets than is optimal (it keeps more liquidity). An increase
in capital can alleviate the moral hazard problem, but also leads to less productive investment.
Proof: see appendix .
The bank owner thus generates too little productive investment compared to the
socially efficient case, and takes too much risk while doing so. The investment decision
follows from the assumption that there is no safety net in the form of a central bank
able to provide emergency liquidity; the bank has to reserve part of its funds to cope
with liquidity shocks. As it has to keep more liquidity on its balance sheet, the bank
tries to make up for the foregone investment returns by taking more risk. This means
the bank owner "gambles" for a higher return in case of success; in case of failure, he
will only lose his capital k because of limited liability. This is harmful to social welfare.
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3.4.3 The Central Bank as the Lender of Last Resort
Conventionally, if liquidity problems cannot be dealt with through the interbank mar-
ket a Central Bank (CB) can step in as the Lender of Last Resort (LLR). The CB will
provide liquidity as long as it deems a bank solvent, allowing it to invest more into
the productive asset and thereby adding to social welfare.
The bank owner then chooses risk-taking and the amount of investment in this new
situation by setting p and l, with equilibrium values p` and l` (where the superscript `
denotes that we are dealing with the possibility of liquidity provision). As in Repullo
(2005) and Kahn and Santos (2005), bank and CB play a simultaneous Bayesian Nash
game in the determination of p and xi. In this game, the CB can only observe the
choice of l (from the bank’s balance sheet) when it has to make a liquidity provision
decision at t = 1; this observation of l is not verifiable. The CB does not know the
choice of p at this moment; it only receives the solvency signal si14. However, the CB
can form a belief about p` through its knowledge of l and k, and the realization of the



















with equilibrium value xli = xi(p
`, l`). This threshold shows that the CB only faces
downside risk; the bank gets the upside. We can also see that the threshold depends
only on the bank’s actual choice of l; it doesn’t change directly with the actual choice of
p. Instead, it is determined by the realization of the signal si and by p`, the equilibrium
value of p.
Furthermore, if x > x`i the bank finds itself in a crisis situation and it will be taken
over completely by the fiscal authority. The depositors will be compensated by the
DIF, and the remaining parts of the bank will be sold by the FA at t = 2. The bank
14 One could say that if the CB knows the form of the function R(·), it can infer the choice of p perfectly
ex post. However, we assume that the CB does not exactly know what the monitoring technology of the
bank looks like. Additionally, it is often not possible to contract upon returns that are not verifiable.
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owner will thus get a zero return when x > x`i; we will relax this assumption in the
next section.











taking into account the equilibrium decision by the CB. The following result obtains.
Proposition 3.3: With a central bank acting as the lender of last resort the bank engages
in moral hazard, but also invests more in the productive asset. An increase in capital can
counteract both these effects.
Proof: see appendix .
The bank thus invests more in productive assets than in the situation without a
liquidity provider: a positive development facilitated by the CB acting as an LLR.
However, it also takes more risks when doing so, which is worse from a social point
of view. This may reflect a moral hazard effect caused by the introduction of a safety
net: since there is a Lender of Last Resort, the bank takes more risk.
To illustrate this phenomenon, we have calibrated our model using reasonable pa-
rameter values. We have specified the returns as a concave decreasing function of p,
namely R(p) = 3− 2p2 (satisfying the assumptions from section 3.3), and the cost of
bankruptcy is set to 0.10 or 10% of the bank’s balance sheet (Repullo, 2005). α is set
to 1 (Cordella and Levy-Yeyati, 2003) and the capital ratio k is assumed to be at the
minimum Basel II requirement, which is 8% of risk weighted assets. We assume that
the risky asset gets a 100% weight. We set q = 0.7 to emphasize the difference between
x0 and x1.
Figure 3.2 shows that investment and the critical shock threshold are indeed nega-
tively related, as an increase in investment means a decrease in liquidity buffers. We
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also see that the probability of success and the solvency threshold are positively re-
lated. This means that an increase in investment should be met with an increase in its
success probability to keep the threshold at the same level. As the right-hand side of
the figure shows this relationship is stronger when the solvency signal is good. At a
given level of p, the threshold is higher when the signal’s realization is s1 than when
it is s0. In other words, the CB is more willing to assist a solvent bank.
The bank will thus face a trade-off between investment and risk-taking if it wants
to induce the CB to set the optimal solvency threshold, given the supervisory signal.
In equilibrium this leads to a lower l, but also a lower p, compared to the situation
without an LLR: there is more productive investment (and less liquidity), but this
goes with increased moral hazard.
Figure 3.2: The optimal solvency threshold xi
Bad signal, i = 0 Good signal, i = 1
In section 3.2 we have stated plausible reasons to abstract from penalty rates and
the “constructive ambiguity” principle15.Instead, we focus on a situation in which the
regulator will bail out the bank by injecting capital and, at the same time, determines
what cost will be attached to this assistance.
15 When we would have a penalty rate (RCB > 1) the bank would choose even lower p and higher l, as in
Repullo (2005). Proof available upon request.
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3.4.4 The possibility of bailout
After analyzing the case where a bank goes simply bankrupt when a large shock
occurs (i.e. when x > xi), we will now have the Fiscal Authority assist the bank in
cases of severe distress. As mentioned above, the FA injects capital kFA,i into the bank
to improve its solvency. The repayment of this capital can be structured in two different
ways: the FA either sets an ex ante premium that has to be repaid by the bank, or it
will demand a share gi in the bank’s final value. These options reflect senior debt and
preferred equity, respectively.
3.4.4.1 Senior debt assistance
We assume that the fiscal authority gets supervisory information from the central
bank. Therefore, the bank and the FA, just as the bank and the CB, play a simultane-
ous Bayesian Nash game. This means that the FA can only condition kFA,i on l and the
realization of x and si, but not on p (only on its equilibrium value pd). We will assume
additionally that the CB and the FA observe each other’s actions, but take them for
granted. There is no ex ante cooperation between the CB and the FA apart from infor-
mation sharing, as the FA also observes the signal si. The only way in which the FA
can influence the CB’s actions is by injecting capital kFA,i. This makes the bank more
solvent from the CB’s viewpoint, thereby increasing the CB’s solvency threshold to xi.
The FA will then require the bank to repay this assistance at a premium rFA(β), where
β is relatively low. The new equilibrium CB threshold xi can be written as follows:




1− (k+ kFA,0(x,pd, l))
, (3.23)




1− (k+ kFA,1(x,pd, l))
. (3.24)
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As the FA only injects capital when the shock x has been observed, it can provide just
enough capital to make x = xi hold:














As we have seen in section 3.3.2, when β is low the FA will not provide kFA,i larger
than kFA,i. Therefore, the new CB threshold xi will not be higher than xmaxi.
These reaction functions of the regulators are known by the bank ex ante, and it will


















The bank again maximizes its value at t = 2, taking into account that it will have
to pay a premium on capital assistance when the shock is higher than xi. This form
of assistance can have effects on both monitoring and risk taking. To see this, observe
that this case is in fact a generalization of the case in section 3.4.3: when β = 0, there
is no FA activity and we are back in the situation with only a CB. By analyzing the
effects of an increase in β at β = 0, we can determine the effect of having FA assistance
in the form of debt. We obtain the following result.
Proposition 3.4: having a Fiscal Authority provide solvency assistance in the form of debt
capital, additional to a CB providing liquidity, has two effects. It leads to less moral hazard and
more productive investment, compared to the case with only a CB as a liquidity provider.
Proof: see appendix .
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This means that the FA policy of injecting capital to increase the solvency threshold
has positive effects: as β increases above zero, which means the FA will take action,
we see that both investment and monitoring increase (p increases and l decreases).
In other words, this policy decreases moral hazard, while it also promotes socially
productive investment.The intuition behind this is straightforward: as long as
rFA(β)kFA(x) < (R(p) − 1)(1− l) the bank gains from assistance by the FA. Therefore,
it pays to increase the probability of success p and decrease liquid reserves l; both
actions increase the part of bank value that the bank owner can appropriate at t = 2.
However, it is common practice to assist banks by providing equity instead of debt
capital; it is thus also useful to assess what happens when the FA claims an equity
stake instead of a fixed premium on its debt assistance. We will address this situation
in the next section.
3.4.4.2 Equity assistance
As before, the CB will be willing to provide liquidity as long as x does not exceed xi.
Above this threshold, the FA will again inject kFAi(x) into the bank. However, it now
stipulates its minimum required return as a share in the bank’s value at t = 2; this is
denoted by gi.
The bank again chooses risk-taking and the amount of investment in this new situ-
ation by setting p and l, with equilibrium values pe and le. The e indicates that we
have added the possibility providing equity capital to the bank. As described before,
gi is determined at t = 1 by the following equations, where we can see it depends on



















Note: the FA will nationalize the bank at E[gi|x > x](β1) = 1.
These will hold with equality in equilibrium, as the FA only needs to break even in
expectation. For the bank, this gi will be a function of the expectation of x, conditional
on x > xi, where xi is determined in a similar manner as in section 3.4.3 and xei is its
equilibrium value. The expected value of gi can be written as:
















Examining the properties of E[gi|x > x] leads us to the following useful result, illus-
trated in Figure 3.3. Note that this only depicts the shape of the functions; it does not
necessarily state the relative sizes of E[g0|x > x0] and E[g1|x > x1].
Lemma 3.1: There exists a level of β, called β1, for which E[gi|x > x] > 1 for i = 0, 1. At or
above β1 the bank is nationalized in expectation, as the FA appropriates all of the bank’s value
at t = 2.
Proof: see appendix .
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To analyze what happens to monitoring and investment when we allow for a bailout
in the form of equity assistance, we can again employ comparative statics on β. Since
the introduction of a bailout possibility means that E[gi|x > xi] < 1 (as opposed to
E[gi|x > xi] = 1, were the bank is nationalized completely), our analysis should focus
on the effect of this change: this consists of a decrease in β from β1.
The bank takes into account that it will now have to pay a premium on capital
assistance when x exceeds x. Its new objective is thus as follows:
max
p,l







A quick look at this objective reveals that the case of β = β1 is the same as the
case in which there is only a CB. Thus, adding the possibility of equity assistance is a
generalization: section 3.4.3 represents a special case in which E[gi|x > xi] = 1. Solving
the bank’s objective and applying Lemma 1, leads to the following result:
Proposition 3.5: having a Fiscal Authority providing solvency assistance in the form of
equity capital, additional to a CB providing liquidity, has two effects. It reduces the bank’s
moral hazard while decreasing productive investment, compared to the case with only a CB
providing liquidity.
Proof: see appendix .
Although the payoff structure is different from debt assistance, the bank has
similar incentives in this setup with equity assistance. It will still want to increase
the probability of success, as it now gains a positive amount when x > xi. As it will
also be assisted under a broader range of shock realizations, the bank needs lower
liquidity buffers and can thus invest more in productive assets.
Our conclusion from this analysis is that the introduction of an FA that, instead of
completely nationalizing the bank, can claim part of bank value at t = 2 (exemplified
by decreasing β below β1) has positive effects. The probability of success p and pro-
ductive investment 1− l both increase. An FA that will not completely nationalize the
bank (g = 1), but leaves something from the bank owner, can thus induce the banker to
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invest more in the risky asset and monitor it better. In the next section, we summarize
the different liquidity and bailout possibilities we have considered above.
3.4.5 Wrapping up
Table 3.2 summarizes the different situations analyzed in the previous sections. As
expected, no regulation or safety net will cause the bank to gamble and hoard too
much liquidity. A central bank can improve on this, but the moral hazard problem will
be more severe. When the government or fiscal authority does not have much concern
for bank failure (low β), it injects capital into the bank in the form of a debt contract.
This will alleviate the moral hazard problem and increase productive investment. A
fiscal authority that attaches much value to bank failure costs (high β), however, will
demand an equity claim on the bank’s value in case capital has to be provided.This
also alleviates the moral hazard problem and leads to more productive investment. The
difference between these two situation lies in the mandate of the FA towards financial
stability: a regulator much concerned with financial stability will want to control the
bank, and thus has to demand an equity stake. A regulator that is less concerned about
bank failure will be able to provide assistance in the form of a debt contract, which
also has a positive effect on investment.
Table 3.2: Effects of different regimes on monitoring and investment, relative to social optimum
Monitoring Investment
No regulation - -
CB as LLR - +
FA owns debt + +
FA owns equity + +
Regulatory authorities that attach much importance to financial stability (as is often
the case in the period after a financial crisis) can thus provide the right incentives
to the banker. As it provides solvency assistance that is costly to the banker (either in
debt or equity form), the banker invests more and monitors this investment better. This
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seems to be at least partly realistic: the nationalization, bailout and guarantee efforts
by governments in the crisis of 2008-2009 have led banks to mitigate their risk taking.
On the other hand, their investments did not markedly increase; a development that
deserves further investigation.
3.5 conclusion
The recent financial crisis has provoked governments and central banks to supply
unusually large amounts of capital and liquidity to banks. Regard for systemic stability
is the main motivation for providing this support to the financial system. However, the
risk for financial stability (ultimately leading to the financial crisis) has arisen because
of excessive risk taking by individual institutions that were central to the system. Since
they thus posed a risk for the financial system as a whole, regulators had no choice
but to prevent them from failing.
Because of the enormous costs that are associated with bank failure, but also with
its prevention, it is necessary to complement Bagehot (1873)’s principle for an LLR
with new measures. In our analytical model, we have thus simultaneously allowed for
liquidity provision (by a central bank) and capital assistance (by a fiscal authority) to
examine how they interact with a bank facing a crisis.
We have assessed this interaction for an individual bank suffering from liquidity
shocks, with which it can only cope by keeping liquid reserves. There is no interbank
market in our model, reflecting a crisis situation in which the interbank market does
not function well. We find that without any safety net a bank hoards too much liquid
assets and takes too much risk, compared to the socially efficient situation.
The introduction of a liquidity provider in the form of a Central Bank (CB) should
alleviate this problem (as suggested by Bagehot (1873)). This CB has no information
other than the bank’s investment level. It cannot observe the bank’s choice of risk
ex ante and can thus not condition its Lender of Last Resort (LLR) policy upon this
information. It does, however, receive an imperfect supervisory signal that provides
partial information about bank solvency. We find that a CB as LLR indeed induces a
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higher investment level. However, the introduction of a safety net also increases moral
hazard as found by Freixas (1999).
To improve the situation, we introduce a second regulator in the form of a fiscal
authority (FA) that is responsible for the bank closure decision. It can also decide
to give the bank a capital injection if it deems the bank solvent. This FA has the same
information as the CB. We find that when the FA has little concern for financial stability,
capital provision in return for a fixed premium is optimal. This mitigates the moral
hazard problem and causes the bank to invest more in productive assets. However,
when the FA is much concerned about bank failure, it will demand an equity claim on
bank value. This can also alleviate the moral hazard problem and increase investment.
Thus, both manners of solvency assistance provide the right incentives to the bank.
To complement Bagehot’s principle of the Lender of Last Resort we introduced an
additional authority that can improve bank solvency. Giving this authority substantial
responsibility for financial stability is not a completely satisfactory solution for curbing
excessive risk taking. This result is partly in line with the situation after the 2008/2009
crisis: although banks took less risk, they also provided less credit to the economy
(an observation that goes against our results). Furthermore, relative effects of CB and
government policies are also likely to play a role: central banks continued to provide
liquidity to stimulate lending. To support this liquidity provision governments had
to improve bank solvency. Strict terms on this solvency assistance required banks to
reduce risk, while they also hoarded more liquid reserves instead of investing more.
This observation merits future research, which should perhaps also take into account
market developments.
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3.a appendix : proofs
Proof of Proposition 3.2:
The bank simultaneously chooses optimal values p = pn and l = ln to maximize
its objective in equation (3.19). The choice of pn is given by the following first order
condition (FOC):




which holds since l > 0: if l = 0, x = 0 and the bank would always fail. The bank would











where we have used ∂x∂(1−l) = −
1
1−k . Under the assumptions on R(p) these FOCs also
fulfill the second order conditions for a maximum.
We can deduce from equations (3.A.1) and (3.A.2) that the bank takes more risk than
is desirable from a social perspective. This follows from our assumption that the
bank invests with leverage (i.e. 1 − k > l > 0), which means 1 − ln > k and thus
R(pn) + pnR ′(pn) > 0. As R(pn) + pnR ′(pn) is decreasing in p, we see that pn < psw.
Furthermore, we can state that ln > 0 = lsw, which follows from assuming that k > 0
and R(pn) > 1 (otherwise it would not be profitable to invest in the risky asset).














∂k > 0 at R(p
n) > 1, a condition that should hold in equilibrium.
70 complementing bagehot
Proof of Proposition 3.3:
The corresponding FOC w.r.t. p and l are:




















where we can see that p` and l` are determined in a similar way as pn and ln.
However, we also see that ln 6= l` when α > 0, which means that xl1 > xl0 > x. To
determine the relative size of ln and l`, we note that when α = 0 the CB will never
intervene. This is equivalent to the situation without a safety net. It is thus straightfor-
ward to perform comparative statics regarding α by taking the total derivative of l`





















) < 0. (3.A.6)
This expression indicates that l` decreases when α increases (a CB is set up), which
means that l` < ln, and thus that 1− l` > 1− ln.
To compare p` with pn, we again consider what happens as α → 0 by performing




























where the inequality holds because of the assumptions on R(p). As the effect of α on
p is negative, we must conclude that p` < pn when α > 0.
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Proof of Proposition 3.4:
Equation (3.27) is maximized according to the following FOC, where we have used
f(x) = 1 and we have not explicitly written out all the partial derivatives to save space:
FOCdp :=
(




































− prFA(β)Z = 0 (3.A.9)
where



















Now we can perform comparative statics on β to see how the bank’s choice of p and l






















The two terms in equation (3.A.10) are, respectively (taking into account that ∂x/∂p =

















































At β = 0, kFA0 = kFA0 = 0 and rFA = 0. Furthermore, the FOC for p reduces to






∂l∂p > 0 when
∂V

















(1− k)((1− q)x0 + qx1)
 , (3.A.14)
since ∂V∂l = −V
1
(1−k)((1−q)x0+qx1)
at β = 0 (following from FOCdl ). From the latter
expression it is not immediately clear whether it is positive or negative. However, for






) < 0. (3.A.15)
Since x0 decreases with q and x1 increases with q equally, there must be a range of
q > 1/2 for which expression (3.A.14) is negative (as long as expression (3.A.15) is
sufficiently negative). We can now conclude that dpdβ > 0 at β = 0, which means that
monitoring increases with β as required.
3.A appendix : proofs 73
Concerning equation (3.A.11) we only need to determine ∂FOC
d
l
∂l (taking into account
















At β = 0, this reduces to 2∂V∂l
(




< 0. Combining this and equation
(3.A.13) evaluated at β = 0, we obtain that dldβ < 0. This means that as β increases,
liquid reserves decrease and thus investment increases, as required.
Proof of Lemma 3.1:
Following our assumptions on RFA(β), we conclude there is a unique value of β for
which E[g|x > x] = 1 if E[g|x > x] is monotonically increasing in β. We call this value
β1. To see why this is the case, we can rewrite our expressions for E[gi|x > x]:
E[g0|x > x] = Pr[x > x0]
rFA(β)(1−q)p
e−(1−pe)q
pe(1−q) kFA0(E[x|x > x0]) +βc
V(pe, l)
,
E[g1|x > x] = Pr[x > x1]
rFA(β)(qp
e−(1−pe)(1−q)
peq) kFA1(E[x|x > x1]) +βc
V(pe, l)
.
We can see that these are negative at β = 0. Their derivatives w.r.t. β are
Pr[x > x0]




r ′FA(β)kFA1E[x|x > x1] + c
V(pe, l)
. (3.A.18)
These are positive for all β > 0, and for E[gi|x > xi] > 1 we need a β such that
E[g0|x > x1] > 1 and E[g1|x > x1] > 1. (3.A.19)
Given that ∂E[gi|x>xi]∂β > 0 for all β and i = 0, 1, and
∂V
∂β = 0, condition (3.A.19) will
hold for large enough β.
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Proof of Proposition 3.5:














































where xi = xi(pe, le). As it is not straightforward to write an explicit solution for
both pe and le from these conditions, we again perform comparative statics on β.
Using Lemma 1, we can analyze what happens if we go from E[gi|x > x] = 1 to
E[gi|x > x] < 1, i.e. if β decreases below β1. We apply the Implicit Function Theorem











































































































x for i ∈ {0, 1} and p
∂V



















































We can thus conclude that dp
e
dβ < 0, which means p increases as β decreases from β
1.
To determine the sign of equation (3.A.23) we only need to determine the sign of the
































































∂l for i ∈ {0, 1}, and after some more


























dβ < 0 and thus liquid reserves decrease as β decreases to below β
1, meaning that
investment increases as required.
4
A D Y N A M I C A N A LY S I S O F B A N K B A I L O U T S A N D
C O N S T R U C T I V E A M B I G U I T Y
This chapter is based on Eijffinger and Nijskens (2012).
4.1 introduction
After the recent financial crisis, calls for new regulation have dominated the academic
debate. While this first centered on how to manage crises better, the debate has now
moved towards reforming prudential regulation and setting up a sustainable financial
system with safeguards. The current Basel capital requirements have not put much
emphasis on banks’ excessive maturity mismatches. Banks have relied increasingly on
short-term funding to invest in long-term assets (Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2009).
Apart from prudential regulation, the Lender of Last Resort (LLR) or bailout function
of central banks has come under discussion. While central banks worldwide have
intervened heavily in interbank markets to alleviate the crisis, they have also been
criticised. This criticism mainly focuses on the forbearing behaviour of regulators, and
the moral hazard their policies have generated: banks took excessive risks knowing
that they would be provided with liquidity. They also held too little capital and were
relying too much on short term funding to finance long term investments.
The large scale bailouts during the 2008-2009 crisis, not only by central banks but
also by national governments (Levy and Schich, 2010), have proven that the banks
were right. And although governments have slowly decreased their exposure to
the banking system since 2010, the European Central Bank (ECB) has not ceased
providing liquidity. To restore confidence in interbank markets as a response to the
current Eurozone crisis, the ECB has even increased the intensity and maturity of its
assistance. We can see this in Figure 4.1: while its main refinancing operations (with 1
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Figure 4.1: ECB refinancing operations
Main Refinancing Operations





























Long Term Refinancing Operations





























Note: This figure illustrates the short- and long term open market operations of the ECB since 2007. This
is not a continuous process; especially the LTRO are performed relatively infrequently. To clarify: the
bars depict how many funds have been provided to the system, while the red line indicates the amount
of bids that exceeded the amount allotted. This means there has been full allotment from 2009 onwards.
Furthermore, the grey areas indicate the global financial crisis and the current Euro crisis, respectively.
Source: http://www.ecb.int/mopo/implement/omo/html/top_history.en.html
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or 2 week maturity) have remained relatively stable since 2010, the ECB has increased
its long term assistance (at least 3 month maturity). The recent outliers in the graph
at the bottom of the figure represent the exceptionally large liquidity injections of
December 2011 and February 2012, which also have a very long maturity of 3 years.
Furthermore, the figure also shows that the ECB has honored all requests for liquidity
since 2009 as there is so-called "full allotment" (no excess bids for liquidity). These
two developments show a clear commitment by the central bank that it will provide
banks with liquidity for a significant period of time; this resembles the Federal
Reserve’s promise to keep interest rates low until at least the end of 2014. Taken
more broadly, this could even be interpreted as solvency instead of liquidity assistance.
However, these commitments have still not persuaded banks to provide funds to
the real sector or to reduce their holdings of (very) risky assets; on the other hand,
this may also be due to difficulty in selling these assets. To alleviate the moral hazard
problem facing central banks it has been argued that a central bank should adhere
to an ambiguous emergency lending strategy (Freixas, 1999; Kocherlakota and Shim,
2007; Shim, 2011). This means that it will ex ante not state whether it will assist the
bank or not; instead, the bank can expect to be assisted only with some probability.
This practice of so-called “constructive ambiguity” has been more common in the
monetary policy context, where it also often linked to incomplete transparency (see
Geraats (2002); Cukierman (2009), and Eijffinger and Hoeberichts (2002); Demertzis
and Hughes Hallett (2007) for evidence). However, as opposed to monetary policy, in
the practice of assisting banks one often has to act very fast in deciding whether a
bank will be assisted or not.
Furthermore, banking regulation is not a one-shot game: a bank raises funds and
invests them continuously. More importantly, decisions that the bank makes now
(i.e. regarding its capital structure) will have an impact on its future profitability
and ability to withstand liquidity shocks. The regulator also takes this into ac-
count, as better capitalized banks and banks that have more liquid reserves are more
likely to be assisted when they knock on the regulator’s door for emergency assistance.
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Recent investigations into the reform of the LLR function have focused on differ-
ent aspects of the LLR, but not often in a dynamic context focusing on constructive
ambiguity1. Kahn and Santos (2005), for instance, focus on the allocation of LLR re-
sponsibility between different agencies. More recently, Eijffinger and Nijskens (2011)2
have analyzed the roles of the central bank and the fiscal authorities in providing liq-
uidity and solvency assistance, respectively. However, both these analyses assume a
static context without considering ambiguity. Regarding penalty rates and the LLR,
Repullo (2005) and Castiglionesi and Wagner (2011) have both found that penalties
increase risk taking by banks and regulatory forbearance. They focus, however, only
on bank risk taking. The analyses most similar to ours are Goodhart and Huang (2005)
and Shim (2011), who allow for multiple time periods and ambiguity, but either do
not incorporate bank incentives at all or do not allow for liquidity choice.
Our approach differs from the abovementioned papers in that we allow for multiple
time periods, but also explicitly take the banker’s incentives into account. Further-
more, we focus explicitly on liquidity problems, leaving out solvency considerations.
We set up a model of an economy consisting of one bank and one regulator with
a Lender of Last Resort mandate from society. They operate in an environment
without (functioning) interbank markets, i.e. a crisis episode. The bank can choose
the structure of its balance sheet, while the regulator has to decide whether to assist
the bank or not when it runs into trouble. In our analysis we want to focus on
the incentives for the bank to hold too little capital and liquidity, and investigate
the institutional details of capital and liquidity requirements in a dynamic context.
Moreover, we assess the effects that failure costs and possible emergency lending
penalties have on the choices of the bank and the regulator.
We find that it is optimal for the regulator to follow a mixed strategy: announcing
that the bank will never be assisted is too costly for society, and therefore not credible,
while always providing liquidity to the bank with certainty causes moral hazard by
the banker. In response to this mixed strategy, the bank will choose capital and liquid-
1 A good overview of two decades of research on LLR and closure policy can be found in Freixas and
Parigi (2008).
2 The model presented in this paper borrows some features of our earlier model.
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ity above the minimum requirements. However, when these requirements or the costs
of capital and liquidity are too high, the bank will not keep more than the minimum
capital or liquidity. For current LLR policy our results imply that the institution re-
sponsible for liquidity assistance should be ambiguous about whether it will assist a
bank or not.
This result is depending on the existence of a commitment technology for the reg-
ulator: it should have enough credibility to adhere to this strategy of constructive
ambiguity. A legally binding mandate from society, together with accountability and
credibility of the regulator, can accomplish this. We will elaborate upon this in the next
section, where we will also relate this commitment technology to the monetary policy
literature.
Furthermore, our analysis also shows that charging a lump sum penalty for LLR
assistance improves the bank’s incentives to hold more capital and reserves. Finally,
increasing the bankers’ time horizon can have positive effects on the assistance proba-
bility and capital, although the amount of liquid reserves decreases. In the next section
we present our institutional environment in more detail.
4.2 institutional setup
We consider an economy that consists of a single bank and a regulator, which
we call the CBFS (Central Bank/Financial Supervisor), who both operate during
two time periods. These periods consist of several stages. In the first stage, the
decisions are made by both players. The bank chooses its liability structure by
setting capital and liquidity and its asset structure by choosing between investing in
risky assets and liquid reserves. The CBFS decides on its Lender of Last Resort pol-
icy by to choosing a certain liquidity assistance policy in the first stage of every period.
In the second stage of each period a liquidity shock occurs. This means that a frac-
tion of deposits will be withdrawn randomly (as in i.e. Repullo (2005) and Eijffinger
and Nijskens (2011)). The bank will have to use its own liquid reserves to cope with
this shock; we assume that there is no access to an interbank market. This resembles a
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crisis situation, similar to that of the 2008 financial crisis and even the current situation
in the interbank market.
Therefore, when the bank cannot cope with the liquidity shock itself, it can go to
the CBFS for liquidity. This resembles the situation many European banks are in at the
moment, with the ECB acting not only as a lender, but even as a full-fledged market
maker of last resort. In our analysis, when the bank turns to the CBFS for liquidity, the
latter has to decide whether to provide liquidity assistance to the bank or not. In case
of liquidity assistance, the bank will receive the amount of liquidity necessary to repay
the withdrawing depositors, and it has to pay a lump sum penalty to society at the
end of each period. This penalty explicitly does not accrue to the CBFS to not distort
its incentives and those of the bank (Castiglionesi and Wagner, 2011).
This structure requires there exists a commitment technology for the CBFS, en-
abling it to adhere to constructive ambiguity. Our CBFS is a credible authority with
a sound reputation that has received a Lender of Last Resort mandate from society.
It is accountable to society but independent in its decision-making. Because of its
independence it is plausible that the CBFS has discretion over its policy decisions; in
the monetary policy literature this type of credibility has been a standard assumption
since the 1980s (Barro and Gordon, 1983; Lohmann, 1992). Alternatively, we can think
of the bank not having complete information about the CBFS’s objective ex ante. This
uncertainty can be reflected in the composition of the CBFS’s governing board: the
bank may not know the exact proportion of hawks and doves in the board, and can
thus not know how strict the CBFS will be. It will have to form a belief about the
CBFS’s objective function, and the resulting bailout probability, that will prove to be
correct in equilibrium. We will come back to this interpretation later.
In the third stage the return on the illiquid asset realizes. If this is positive, the bank
will reap the rewards, pay back the regulator and continue into the next period. The
bank keeps its capital, and profits are consumed or partly invested into new capital
that can be put to productive use. If, however, the risky asset pays off zero the bank
fails, the CBFS loses its liquidity injection and a new bank owner will be put in place.
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The game between bank and CBFS starts again from scratch in the next period.
The choices of the bank have different effects on the equilibrium payoffs in our
model. To begin with, when the banker finances the bank with his own capital (in-
stead of deposits) this has several advantages. First of all, the size of the possible
shock decreases as the ratio of deposits to total liabilities is lower. This also increases
the probability of continuing into the next period. Furthermore, a higher capital ratio
increases the probability that the CBFS assists the bank if necessary. Finally, profit in
period 2 increases, since initial capital has positive value in period 2, but is already
fully paid for in period 1. The disadvantage of funding the bank with capital is that it
reduces profit in period 1, since the costs of capital are increasing more than propor-
tionally with investment in capital. Liquid reserves have the benefit that they increase
the capability of coping with liquidity shocks. This means that they also increase the
probability of continuing into the next period. The disadvantage of liquidity, however,
is its opportunity cost: it reduces the amount of assets available for risky investment,
and thus the profits from this investment. Table 4.1 summarizes this institutional setup
as an overview of the players’ choices in both time periods.
Table 4.1: Overview of players and their choices
Player Choices
Bank Capital, deposits, liquidity, risky assets
CBFS Liquidity assistance policy
How does our approach differ from the existing literature? To begin with, there are
not very many analyses of LLR assistance and ambiguity, and even less that take place
in a dynamic context. A natural first example is the analysis by Freixas (1999), who
analyzes the optimal behaviour of the LLR in response to the choice of uninsured debt
by banks. A crucial assumption is that the LLR finds rescuing banks costly. As never
assisting a bank is not credible (this would be even more costly, especially for large
banks), the LLR engages in “constructive ambiguity”: it follows a mixed strategy in
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rescuing the bank. A drawback of this analysis is that it only considers the liability
side of the bank; no specific attention is paid to liquidity management.
Cordella and Levy-Yeyati (2003) also touch upon constructive ambiguity: they argue
against it. Their analysis demonstrates that having a clear, unambiguous emergency
lending policy creates a charter value effect that outweighs the moral hazard costs.
Yet again, these authors do not take into account liquidity management and the effect
this can have on the bank’s demand for liquidity assistance.
The abovementioned analyses take a static perspective. To our knowledge there are
only a few studies that employ a dynamic framework. A notable example is Goodhart
and Huang (2005), who analyze the decision of whether a central bank should engage
in open market operations to manage liquidity or whether it should provide direct
LLR assistance. They conclude that a Too-Big-to-Fail policy can be rationalized, but
only when moral hazard is the sole concern. In case contagion is also a concern, this
is the main reason for LLR assistance, leading to a Too-Many-to-Fail policy. Although
the authors provide a very thorough analysis of the central bank’s incentives, they do
not take into account the incentives of the bank manager; an issue that our analysis
focuses on.
Another, more recent, example of LLR in a dynamic context is Shim (2011). He sets
up a model containing hidden risk choice, private information on returns, limited
commitment by the bank owner and costly liquidation. In his analysis, he finds
that a combination of capital requirements and risk-based deposit insurance can
implement an optimal allocation. This is coupled with a stochastic liquidation policy,
i.e. constructive ambiguity. In contrast to our analysis, his focus lies more on capital
regulation rather than on both liquidity and capital requirements.
Finally, we have to note that our model does not contain any uncertainty about
the regulator’s objectives (as in Cukierman and Meltzer (1986)). In this respect, our
model differs from those by Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2008), Vinogradov (2012),
Bosma (2011) or Cukierman and Izhakian (2011). We abstract from this uncertainty;
in our analysis, the bank and the regulator know each other’s objectives, but each
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makes choices that are unobservable to the other ex ante. Nevertheless, this remains
an important issue, and in section 4.4 we come back to this.
4.3 the model
Our model takes the same basic assumptions about bank choices as in Eijffinger and
Nijskens (2011), except for the choice of monitoring p. Instead, the bank chooses its
capital ratio. To start with, let us consider an economy consisting of one bank and
one regulator. There are two time periods, indexed by t = 1, 2, to allow us to focus
specifically on the effect of period 1 decisions on period 2. Each time period consists
of several stages that will be described below. Figure 4.2 on page 88 clarifies the de-
scription that will follow.
At t = 1 one unit of funds is required to set up a bank3. The bank owner faces only
limited liability. He chooses how many of his own funds to invest in capital, denoted
by it. The rest is raised by attracting deposits dt, such that it+dt = 1. The net deposit
rate is normalized to zero (we assume deposits are insured, so they are risk-free), and
the bank cannot influence this rate: there is a perfectly elastic supply of deposits at
an exogenous rate of zero4. We also assume that the depositor base is sticky, so the
amount of deposits chosen in period 1 is the same as that in period 2, so d1 = d2 = d.
Capital investment entails a cost φ(it), which is a convex function. Capital (espe-
cially equity) is often assumed to be costly because of adverse selection, agency or
transaction costs (Holmstrom and Tirole, 1997; Hellmann et al., 2000; Estrella, 2004).
Other, bank-specific reasons may be that capital leads to liquidity reduction (Diamond
and Rajan, 2000) or that the banker has a certain opportunity cost of funds (Repullo,
2005). The reason why these costs are convex in our model is that convexity facili-
tates an interior solution for capital investment (Mehran and Thakor, 2011), as we will
3 This effectively normalizes period 1 bank size to one. This should not be a problem as we do not focus
on Too-Big-to-Fail issues. Alternatively, we can fix the size of liabilities by fixing the deposit rate or by
assuming a decreasing deposit supply function
4 This allows us to focus on the liquidity and capital choices of the bank, without having to consider
competition issues. This assumption can be rationalized by considering, for instance, a large foreign
market for deposits or by assuming that the outside option of depositors is equal to the offered deposit
rate.
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describe below. Investment in capital augments the capital stock kt, according to the
following law of motion:
kt = kt−1 + it (4.1)
with k0 = 0. Since the total endowment is equal to 1, we can thus use this law of
motion to determine that d ≡ 1− k1.
When he has set up the bank, the banker can choose to allocate funds towards
two different assets. The long term asset at has a positive gross return R > 15 with
probability p; with probability 1− p the return on at will be zero and the bank fails.
The other asset lt is a short term storage technology, which can be liquidated at any
time during the period but generates a zero return for sure (risk-free). This can be




We can then write end-of-period bank value as follows:
Vt = Rat + lt − dt, (4.2)
which, using d ≡ 1− k1, at = d+ kt − lt and the cost function φ(it), translates to
expected end of period profit
Πt = p[(R− 1)(d+ kt − lt) + it −φ(it)]. (4.3)
During each time period, a liquidity shock x̃t ∼ U(0, 1) occurs after the bank has
made its decisions. It leads to a withdrawal of deposits amounting to xtd, where xt is
the realization of x̃t.
5 For an interior solution, regularity requires that R < 2 as well. This seems reasonable, as R > 2 corre-
sponds to a net return of more than 100% which is not very realistic.
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If the bank has enough liquid reserves relative to deposits, it can cope with the shock.
This means that the withdrawn amount has to be smaller than the amount of liquid
reserves, or xtd < lt. From this expression we can deduce a threshold xt = lt/d, below
which the bank can meet the liquidity demand. The probability that this happens is
Pr[xt < xt] = xt, since xt is uniformly distributed.
However, when liquid reserves are not adequate to meet the liquidity demand after
a shock (xt > xt with Pr[xt > xt] = (1− xt)), the bank will fail if it is not assisted
by the CBFS. If it is assisted by the CBFS, the bank will have to pay a lump sum
penalty T , that accrues to society via the deposit insurance fund. This penalty is smaller
than the excess return on risky investment: T < R − 1. This gives the bank owner
sufficient incentive to set up a bank. Additionally, the penalty is smaller than the costs
of bankruptcy (T < c). If it is larger, the CBFS will always rescue the bank, which is not
in the interest of the bank owner itself as this rescue will be expensive for the bank.
In the final step the return on the risky asset realizes. If this is equal to R, the
remaining depositors are repaid, bank profits realize and the bank continues. If it is
equal to zero, the bank fails, depositors are reimbursed via the deposit guarantee fund
and the current bank owner will get 0. A new bank owner, again with endowment 1,



















































































Note: this sequence is followed in time period 1 and repeated in period 2. The last two columns describe the bank’s profit and the
CBFS’s loss, respectively. Furthermore, the CBFS incurs no loss when the bank fails in case of a small liquidity shock: as the CBFS
has not been required to make a decision, it will not be held responsible for any bank failures.
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Under the above assumptions, we can write expected per period profit as follows:
E[Πt] = (xt + (1− xt)qt)Πt − p(1− xt)qtT , (4.4)
where qt is the probability of assistance determined by the CBFS (this process will be
described below). From the perspective of the current bank owner period 2 profit only
matters when the bank succeeds in period 1 and continues to period 2. We can write a
continuation probability that depends on the bank’s own choices and that of the CBFS:
Pr[Continue]t ≡ p(xt + (1− xt)qt).
Using this and denoting the discount factor by β we can connect the two periods:
E[Π] = E[Π1] + p(x1 + (1− x1)q1)βE[Π2], (4.5)
which is the objective the bank wants to maximize by choosing l1, i1, l2 and i2. This
equation tells us that the choices of liquidity and capital in period 1 do not only affect
profit at t = 1, but also the probability that the bank will continue into period 2.
This probability increases when x1 increases due to liquidity or capital, but it is also
dependent on q1, which is determined by the CBFS.
Before we explain the regulator’s objectives, one last remark about the choice of i2 is
in order. The bank owner can raise deposits only at t = 1. At t = 2, he can only use the
profits from the previous period to increase capital and thus the size of the bank. We
assume that the depositor base is fixed, and that no sale of capital is allowed (i2 > 0).
As will be explained below, the no sale constraint will never be met. Furthermore,
capital investment in period 2 does not affect anything but the amount of available
assets for investment. The capital investment i2 is thus determined by a very simple
cost benefit analysis (for more details see the appendix):
R = φ ′(i2). (4.6)
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Additionally, capital and liquid reserves are subject to minimum requirements,
which are denoted by k and l, respectively. These will play a role in determining the
equilibrium values of capital and liquidity, as we will see in the next section. In the
end, the banker faces a trade-off between profits (by increasing leverage) on the one
hand, and the risk of liquidity problems and facing the regulator on the other.
The CBFS is the only source of liquidity for the bank beyond its own liquid reserves.
After observing a shock, the CBFS will decide whether it intervenes and provides the
bank with liquidity, or whether it lets the bank fail. In the latter case, the remainder
of the bank will be seized by the deposit insurance fund (a passive authority), which
pays out the remaining depositors, and a new bank owner with endowment 1 will
be put in place. Additionally, the CBFS will incur the costs of bank failure c, which
can be thought of as disruptions in the payment system, misallocation of funds or the
destruction of lending relationships; in general, c represents problems with financial
intermediation that are related to decisions made by the CBFS.
As we have described in section 4.2, the CBFS can credibly follow a certain liquidity
assistance strategy ex ante. This does not have to be a pure strategy in all periods; the
CBFS can also follow a policy that specifies a certain probability qt with which the
bank will be rescued6. In determining this probability, the CBFS will weigh the costs
of intervening against the costs of letting the bank fail. The costs of letting the bank
fail are the (social) costs of bank failure c. The costs of intervention will only realize
when the bank fails at the end of the period, i.e. when the investment does not succeed
with probability 1−p. These costs consist of the amount of liquidity provided, and the
social bank failure costs that arise since the bank has failed. The amount of liquidity
6 This qt can also be interpreted as a proxy for the proportion of hawks and doves on the CBFS’s governing
council; this proportion determines the likelihood of the CBFS assisting a bank in distress.
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provided is equal to xtd− lt. Denoting not assisting the bank by f (for failure) and
rescuing the bank by r, we can write the respective losses as follows:
Lft = c
E[Lrt] = (1− p)(xtd− lt︸ ︷︷ ︸
liq. support
+c).
As we can see the bank’s choices also determine the size of these costs: the more
capital and liquidity the bank chooses, the lower the costs of assisting the bank are.
The expected value of xt, conditional on it being larger than xt, is∫1
xt
xtdf(xt) = (1− xt)E[xt|xt > xt]. (4.7)
Using equation (4.7) and the probability of assistance qt we arrive at the following
per period CBFS expected loss function:
E[Lt] = (1− xt)[(1− qt)c+ qt(1− p)(E[xt|xt > xt]d− lt + c)]. (4.8)
Aggregating across periods, we can write the CBFS loss function as follows (γ is the
CBFS discount factor):
E[L] = E[L1] + γE[L2]. (4.9)
By choosing qt, the CBFS will want to minimize its loss function. For regularity,
we further assume that the CBFS will never intervene when the bank’s capital and
liquidity are at the bare minimum; if we would not assume this, the bank would clearly
engage in moral hazard immediately. This will be formalized in the next section.
92 a dynamic analysis of bank bailouts and constructive ambiguity
4.4 a dynamic equilibrium
To establish the equilibrium of our dynamic game, we first solve the CBFS’s problem,
as this is the most straightforward one. The CBFS will want to minimize E[L] w.r.t qt.
Closer scrutiny of this objective shows that this problem is not truly dynamic in qt;
the CBFS’s problem consists of two separate problems. Therefore, the conditions for
an interior solution for both q1 and q2 follow from the CBFS’s First Order Conditions
(FOC) in both periods:
∂E[L]
∂q1
= (1− x1)(−c+ (1− p)(
1
2
(x1 + 1)d1 − l1 + c)) = 0 (4.10)
∂E[L]
∂q2
= γ(1− x2)(−c+ (1− p)(
1
2
(x2 + 1)d2 − l2 + c)) = 0. (4.11)
Taking into account that (1− xt) is a probability and γ a discount factor we know that




= l1 + k1 and 1−
2pc
1− p
= l2 + k1, (4.12)
which again translates to




For this condition to hold as an interior equilibrium, in which the CBFS plays a
mixed strategy and the bank chooses liquidity and capital above the minimum, we
have to assume that 1 − 2pc1−p > l + k. As is mentioned above, this means that the
CBFS will never provide liquidity when both liquidity and capital are at the minimum.
The bank will maximize its expected profit E[Π] w.r.t. l1, i1, l2 and i2. The FOC for
this problem we have put in the appendix because of space considerations. As we now
have all conditions to establish the reaction functions of bank and CBFS, we can solve
them to obtain an equilibrium. As follows from the proposition below, this equilibrium
does not involve strategies in which the bank will be either always or never assisted.
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Proposition 4.1: in equilibrium, the CBFS will not play a pure “always assist” strategy in
any period. The CBFS is also not able to credibly commit to a “never assist” strategy.
Proof: see appendix. 
We can intuitively explain the proof for a mixed strategy as follows; it goes by
contradiction and its intuition resembles that in Freixas (1999). To start with, an uncon-
ditional “always rescue” policy (qt = 1 for t = 1, 2) will generate clear moral hazard
problems: the bank will choose its capital and liquidity buffers to be as low as possible,
which is too costly for the CBFS. It is thus never optimal to provide assistance with
probability 1. A “never rescue” policy (qt = 0 for t = 1, 2) is also not sustainable, albeit
for more subtle reasons: in this case the bank will self-insure against liquidity shocks.
It will choose less leverage at t = 1 and more liquidity in both periods, even above the
capital and reserve requirements. Technically, this leads to capital and liquidity being
too high for the CBFS to be able to sustain a strategy of never rescuing the bank. More
intuitively, this policy is not credible for the CBFS to commit to, as always letting the
bank fail will be excessively costly.
For “never assist” and “always assist” equilibria to be ruled out, only a few
additional parameter assumptions have to be made. One is that the penalty that
the bank faces in case of rescue is smaller than the profit it can make on its risky
investment (T < R− 1). If this is not the case, the bank owner will not want to start up
the bank as his expected profit will always be negative. Furthermore, the probability
of success and return should not be too large, lest the CBFS will choose to always lend
to the bank as a high probability of success reduces the cost of liquidity assistance:
2p
1−pc < 1. This means that the condition on T and R can be specified even stricter
(as we show in the appendix): T < 2p1−pc(R− 1), which is a necessary condition for a
“pure assist” strategy to be ruled out in equilibrium. The last assumption is that the
penalty should also be smaller than the social cost of bankruptcy (T < c) to prevent
distortion of the CBFS’s incentives.
The only sustainable equilibrium is thus a mixed one: the probability of rescue in any
period lies between 0 and 1. A mixed strategy Nash equilibrium always exists in a finite
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game such as ours, which means that there is an equilibrium with {q1,q2} ∈ (0, 1),
{l1, l2} ∈ (l, 1), i1 = k1 ∈ (k, 1) and i2 ∈ (0, 1). In this completely mixed equilibrium,
the bank chooses capital and liquidity above the minimum required, while the CBFS
plays a mixed strategy. However, as proposition 4.2 below states, the equilibrium can
also be only partly mixed; the bank will choose either minimum capital or minimum
liquidity in equilibrium.
Proposition 4.2: there exists a unique equilibrium consisting of a mixed strategy for the
CBFS and, depending on minimum capital and liquidity requirements, the convexity of the
cost of capital and the return on risky investment, different strategies for the bank. In this
mixed strategy equilibrium, the level of liquidity is the same in both periods, while there is a
trade-off between capital and liquidity in period 1.
More specifically:
1. If capital costs are high enough (φ(·) is sufficiently convex), the bank will choose capital
in period 1 to be at the minimum required: i1 = k1 = k. Liquidity in both periods will
be higher than when k1 > k, to fulfill condition (4.13).
2. If R is high enough and φ(·) not too convex, the bank will keep liquidity at the minimum:
l1 = l2 = l. Capital will be higher than when l1 = l2 > l, to fulfill condition (4.13).
Proof: see appendix. 
This proposition explains that, when capital costs are too high (i.e. quite convex),
the bank will choose to satisfy the CBFS’s indifference constraint by choosing more
liquidity and minimum capital. On the other hand, when the return on the risky asset
is too high, the bank will keep less liquid reserves and choose a higher capital ratio at
t = 1 7. The following corollary elaborates upon this.
7 Note that there may also be parameterizations of φ(·) and R for which i1 = k1 = k and l1 = l2 = l. As
we have assumed that l+ k < 1− 2pc1−p , this will result in an equilibrium with q1 = q2 = 0, which we
have ruled out.
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Corollary 4.1: minimum capital and liquidity requirements increase the likelihood of partial
corner solutions; an equilibrium with either lt or it at the minimum requirement is more likely
when k and l increase.
Proof: following from Proposition 4.2, when the cost of capital or R is high, the bank
will choose minimum capital or minimum liquidity. If these minimum levels are
higher, they will be reached more easily. In other words, φ(·) or R have to increase
less for corner solutions to hold. 
The above corollary states that when minimum capital or liquidity requirements
increase, the bank will be more likely to choose a capital or liquidity ratio at the
minimum when the opportunity costs for both variables increase.
To clarify the reasoning behind Propositions 4.1 and 4.2 and Corollary 4.1, Figure
4.3 displays the reaction functions of the bank and the CBFS8. We immediately see
that the CBFS will never set q1 to 1, so an “always assist” strategy is not feasible. The
equilibrium is clearly an interior one. Note that in equilibrium liquidity is indeed
equal in both periods, and that both right hand figures feature i1 on the horizontal
axis: investment in period 2 does not play a role in determining the assistance
probability in our model. Finally, we can see the reasoning behind Proposition 4.2
and Corollary 4.1: if the opportunity cost of either liquidity or capital increases,
the bank’s reaction functions shift to the left. If this shift is strong enough, or the
minimum requirement on liquidity or capital is high enough, the intersection point of
the reaction functions may lie at the minimum requirement.
As a final note on the solution, the existence of this equilibrium is of course under
the implicit assumption that the regulator can commit to a mixed strategy over mul-
tiple time periods. If this assumption could not hold, the equilibrium would not be
time-consistent. In section 4.2, however, we have already noted that this assumption
derives from the monetary policy literature: the central bank is a credible, transparent
and independent authority that can commit ex ante to a specific strategy.
8 The parameter values used for this figure are l = 5%, k = 5%, R = 1.2, p = 0.7, β = 0.95, T = 9% and
c = 10%. The cost function is φ(it) = it + 4i2t .
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Note: the solid line represents the bank’s reaction function, while the dashed line represents the CBFS’s.
Several mechanisms can serve as the basis for this commitment technology. Of
course, in a repeated game the most straightforward commitment device is reputa-
tion as in Barro and Gordon (1983) and Backus and Driffill (1985). We can also think
of the objective or technology of the CBFS as being ambiguous in itself. Cukierman
and Meltzer (1986) already suggested this: they provide a theory of a monetary poli-
cymaker whose preferences are stochastically determined, but who has more informa-
tion about their realization than the public. This ambiguity can also mean, for instance,
that the bank does not know the exact magnitude of the bank failure costs c that are
imposed on the CBFS if the bank fails (Bosma, 2011); the CBFS does know this. In
equilibrium, the bank then has to rely on signals about these failure costs to determine
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its belief. As has been suggested recently, the policymaker can additionally be explic-
itly ambiguous about of its policy (Vinogradov, 2012; Cukierman and Izhakian, 2011).
However, the effects of this type of ambiguity are not always beneficial.
Our model can be thought of as building on any of these commitment technologies;
we do not specify the technology explicitly since we want to focus on the interaction
between the bank and the CBFS. Exploring these different commitment mechanisms
any further is, therefore, beyond the scope of this paper.
4.5 comparative statics
The institutional structure of the CBFS will determine equilibrium values. Specifically,
the penalty T that the bank has to pay when assisted and the social costs of bankruptcy
c will play a role. Note that these are defined as fractions of the bank’s size in period
1, which means they lie between zero and one.
Proposition 4.3: the probability of liquidity assistance in both periods increases with the
bank’s penalty T and the social costs of bankruptcy c.
Proof: see appendix. 
An increase in the penalty T means that the bank owner has to pay more to soci-
ety in the event of liquidity assistance. We can think of this as an increase in public
indignation leading to a demand for bankers to pay more to society if they need assis-
tance. The penalty then increases the probability of liquidity assistance, as it rewards
prudent behaviour. This means that the bank will want to invest more in capital to
avoid having to pay the penalty. Although this investment increases the probability
of assistance by the CBFS, it also increases the probability that the bank can survive
without any assistance and thus does not have to pay T .
A higher cost of bank failure c means that the CBFS will incur a higher loss in case
the bank fails. A higher c can reflect a change in the CBFS’s mandate, increasing the
responsibility the CBFS bears for the banking system. It can also reflect a stronger con-
nection between the banking sector and the real economy (i.e. through the payment
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system), which means that the failure of a bank has more severe implications for the
rest of the economy. Therefore, higher social costs of bankruptcy decrease the liquidity
and capital levels needed to sustain a mixed strategy; a more concerned CBFS will
require less investment by the banker to be able to provide liquidity assistance in
equilibrium.
The effect on q1 and q2 of T and c is illustrated in the top row of Figure 4.4 below.
This figure shows that for low values of T and c, the probability of receiving emergency
liquidity in period 1 is always lower than that in period 2. The intuition behind this is
that at period 1, the CBFS will want to signal that it is not very concerned about bank
failure, to sustain the belief of the bank that it indeed is little concerned about failure
and that the bank should keep high capital and liquidity also in the next period. In
period 2 (the last period) this motive for the CBFS is no longer present, so the assistance
probability can be higher. This discrepancy between periods 1 and 2 disappears as soon
as c is high enough: it is no longer possible for the CBFS to sustain the bank’s belief
that it is not concerned about bankruptcy. A high T (above 18% of bank size under our
parametrization) leads the bank to invest so much in capital that the CBFS will choose
qt = 1 in both periods. However, since it violates our parameter assumptions on T this
will not occur in equilibrium.
Note also that there is a minimum level of c for the CBFS to be concerned; if c is
too low, the CBFS will not be willing to assist the bank for any level of liquidity and
capital. This minimum level is lower for q2 than for q1, again demonstrating that the
CBFS has no concerns about the future in period 2. The CBFS will thus require less
liquidity and capital investment efforts from the bank in period 2 to warrant a certain
assistance probability.
Besides the institutional details of the CBFS, the probability that the bank’s invest-
ment succeeds and the discount factor (the inverse of the rate of time preference) are
important in determining the equilibrium outcome.
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Note: the solid line represents q1, while the dashed line represents q2.
Proposition 4.4: the probability of success p increases the probability of liquidity assistance,
but decreases the bank’s investment in capital and liquid reserves. The discount factor β in-
creases the probability of assistance in both periods via an increase in period 1 capital.
Proof: see appendix. 
An increase in p increases the probability that the bank succeeds at the end of
each period, which means that the CBFS has to worry less about the repayment of its
liquidity injection. In other words, the default or solvency risk of the bank is lower.
Therefore, the probability of emergency lending is positively affected by an increase in
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the probability of success. However, since the CBFS will be more lenient, the bank also
has to invest less in capital and liquidity to satisfy the condition for a mixed strategy
equilibrium.
The effect of β is more subtle. Increasing the discount factor β increases the
importance of period 2 for the banker; it decreases banker myopia. He will thus
want to increase both expected period 2 profit E[Π2] and the probability of arriving
at period 2. Increasing liquid reserves decreases the amount of assets available for
investment and thus the investment return in period 2. Investment in capital in period
1 increases E[Π] and the probability of continuation after period 1 by decreasing the
size of the liquidity shock and increasing the assistance probability q1. Therefore,
in period 1 the bank will want to invest more in capital and less in liquidity as the
importance of period 2 increases.
The row at the bottom of Figure 4.4 shows these effects. A first observation tells
us that the discount factor has limited effect; even with a discount rate of more than
40%, the probability of liquidity assistance is still far above zero. Furthermore, we can
see that there exists a minimum value of the success probability p for the CBFS to be
willing to assist the bank. If the probability of success is too low, the probability that
the CBFS loses the liquidity it lent to the bank is too high. This is again, analogous to
the minimum value of the bank failure cost c, lower for q2 than for q1: when setting
q1, period 2 still matters, while there is no concern about the future when setting q2.
The probability of success is thus more important in period 1 than in period 2.
4.6 conclusion
Calls for new banking regulation have been numerous during the aftermath of the
financial crisis. One of the main questions has been how to design a proper system
of financial regulation, consisting of both prudential measures and a safety net. This
system should provide protection to depositors, other debtors and the economy as a
whole, while also preventing moral hazard by banks and other financial institutions.
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In our model, we analyze the game between a bank and a regulator in a dynamic
context, taking into account that the regulator can implement a mixed strategy in pro-
viding individual liquidity assistance. We find that unconditional assistance leads to
too much moral hazard, while a policy without any assistance is not credible. There-
fore, a mixed strategy, conditional on the choices of liquidity and capital by the bank, is
the equilibrium solution. The bank chooses above minimum capital and liquidity, un-
less capital costs or the opportunity cost of liquidity are too high. In case one of either
type of costs is too high, the equilibrium can still be sustained. When both are high,
however, the bank will have to choose capital and liquidity to be at the minimum.
In this case, liquidity assistance costs will be too high for any size of the liquidity
shock, so the regulator will never assist the bank and there will be no equilibrium.
We also find that the probability of emergency lending is higher for a regulator more
concerned about bank failure, a bank more concerned about the future, a higher suc-
cess probability and a higher the penalty for the bank. This last finding suggests that
forbearance arising from penalty rates is not entirely eliminated.
As a starting point, our model takes the same basic assumptions as in Eijffinger
and Nijskens (2011); the only difference is that monitoring choice is replaced by the
choice of capital. We add to the existing literature by analyzing LLR policy over
multiple periods, while taking into account explicitly both the regulator’s and the
bank’s incentives. A novel result is that the only possible strategy for the regulator is
a mixed one: constructive ambiguity is the only solution to our game. Furthermore,
we provide the bank with two different variables to fulfill the requirements for
liquidity assistance: both capital and liquidity choice can be altered to maximize the
expected profit over all periods. Our final major addition to the literature is that we
find an indirect forbearance effect of penalties on liquidity assistance: even though
these penalties are not paid to the regulator directly, they increase the probability of
assistance.
Our results can have important policy implications for reforming LLR policy. The
institution responsible for liquidity assistance (preferably an independent institution
like the central bank) should not state explicitly what its line of action will be. Instead,
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it should be ambiguous about whether it will assist an individual bank or not, and
retain some discretion up until the point that the bank will ask for assistance. Our
analysis also shows that it is useful to let the bank pay a (lump sum) penalty when it
receives assistance, as this indeed improves the incentives to hold more capital and
reserves. Finally, we find that decreasing the myopia of bankers can have positive
effects on assistance probability and capital, but a negative effect on liquidity holdings.
Is this type of ambiguity policy feasible in practice? One example, albeit in a slightly
different context, may be the Securities Markets Programme (SMP) of the ECB. The
SMP authorizes the ECB to facilitate liquidity transformation and monetary transmis-
sion by purchasing securities in the secondary market. The SMP has been introduced
on May 10, 2010 with the exact words:
“The objective of this programme is to address the malfunctioning of securities mar-
kets and restore an appropriate monetary policy transmission mechanism. The scope
of the interventions will be determined by the Governing Council.”9
The second sentence of this quote is key: the ECB Governing Council will retain
discretion up to the point that assistance is needed. This means that the ECB can be
ambiguous about the exact content, counterparties and conditions of this assistance ex
ante. Furthermore, ex post the ECB will not publish which securities it bought, their
price or the counterparties involved in its purchases; it only publishes the amount of
securities bought.
We have presented a model to analyze the possibility of constructive ambiguity in
lending to illiquid banks, under the assumption that the central bank has the credibil-
ity to follow this strategy ex ante. An important prerequisite for our results to hold
is, therefore, the existence of a commitment technology for the regulator. As we have
argued, this commitment may be provided by a mandate coupled with accountability.
This should be provided to a credible authority with a good reputation, as is often the
case in monetary policy. A regulator with these characteristics can internalize bank be-
9 ECB decides on measures to address severe tensions in financial markets, 10 May 2010, http://www.ecb.
int/press/pr/date/2010/html/pr100510.en.html
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haviour without being subject to regulatory forbearance, as it will be able to follow a
strategy of constructive ambiguity. This implies that a more general setup should also
encompass an analysis of this commitment technology. Therefore, a further investiga-
tion into (political) commitment mechanisms is warranted to grasp better the dynamic
effects of emergency lending policies. This, however, remains for future research.
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4.a appendix
4.a.1 Equilibrium Conditions
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((1− q2)(V(l2, i2, i1) −φ(i2)) + q2T)
− (x2 + (1− x2)q2)(R− 1)) = 0 (4.A.3)
∂E[Π]
∂i2
= βp(x2 + (1− x2)q2)(R−φ
′(i2)) = 0. (4.A.4)
From the first order conditions in equations (4.A.1) and (4.A.3) we can derive the




V(l1, i1) +βE[Π2] −φ(i1) − l1(R− 1)
V(l1, i1) +βE[Π2] −φ(i1) + (R− 1)(1− i1 − l1) − T
(4.A.5)
q∗2 =
V(l2, i2, i1) −φ(i2) − l2(R− 1)




Proof of Proposition 4.1:
Our goal is to show that there does not exist a subgame perfect equilibrium in which
the CBFS plays a pure strategy in any period. In other words, no equilibrium with
q1 = {0, 1} and/or q2 = {0, 1} can be sustained. The proof makes use of backward
induction and proceeds in steps.
Step 1:
Let us first consider period 2, in which the CBFS chooses q2 and the bank chooses
l2 and i2. Assuming that q2 = 1, i.e. a full bailout at t = 2, we first observe that
from equation (4.A.3) it follows that i1 = 1− TR−1 . Furthermore, as stated in the text
we make an auxiliary (technical) assumption that TR−1 <
2pc
1−p . This means that the
penalty cannot be too large relative to the investment return and the cutoff point for
the CBFS. Then, we have several different situations at t = 1:
1. q1 = 1, from which follows that l2 > 1−
2pc




1−p . Equation (4.A.2)
requires that l1 + βpl2 = T(R−1)2 (φ
′(1 − TR−1) − (1 + βp)). However, a balance
sheet constraint also has to be fulfilled: l1 + βpl2 6 1+ βp(1+ i2). From (4.A.4)
we can deduce that φ ′(i2) = R. We can transform this to i2 = ψ(R) by taking the
function ψ(·) as the inverse of φ ′(·), or ψ(·) = φ ′−1(·) which is increasing. This






) − (1+βp)) 6 1+βp(1+ψ(R)). (4.A.7)
As φ(·) is convex, φ ′(·) > ψ(·) and ∂(1−
T
R−1 )
∂R > 1, this cannot hold for reasonably
large R.
2. q1 = 0, from which follows that l1 < 1 −
2pc




1−p . We have
assumed that T < R− 1 and 2pc1−p < 1. If we additionally restrict the parameter
space such that TR−1 −
2pc
1−p < 0, the above condition on l1 cannot hold.
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this is also no equilibrium.
Step 2:
Having established that a full bailout at t = 2 is not sustainable in equilibrium, we
now consider the situation where q2 = 0. This means the CBFS never assists the bank
at t = 2. We know that this means that l2 < 1−
2pc
1−p − i1. The following situations can
occur at t = 1:
1. q1 = 0, which requires that l1 < 1 −
2pc





(V(l2, i2) −φ(i2)) − (x2)(R− 1)) = 0, or (4.A.8)
V(l2, i2) −φ(i2) = l2(R− 1). (4.A.9)
Using this and our earlier condition i2 = ψ(R), we can write i1 as
i1 = φ(ψ(R)) −ψ(R)R+ (R− 1)(2l2 − 1) (4.A.10)





Furthermore, l2 < 1−
2pc
1−p − i1 must hold. Using (4.A.10) this translates to
l2 <
R(1+ψ(R)) − ( 2pc1−p +φ(ψ(R))
2R− 1
. (4.A.12)
Some algebra shows that the derivative w.r.t R of the RHS of condition (4.A.11)
is larger than that of condition (4.A.12) when ψ(R) > 4pc1−p − 1. This means that,
for large enough R and reasonable p and c, the two conditions cannot hold si-
multaneously and q1 = 0 cannot be an equilibrium.
2. q1 = 1, leading to l1 > 1 −
2pc
1−p − i1 and i1 = 1 −
T
R−1 , which cannot be an
equilibrium as we have shown above in step 1.
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3. q1 ∈ (0, 1), which requires that l1 = 1− 2pc1−p − i1. Applying the same reasoning
as in the q1 = 0 case, this cannot be an equilibrium for reasonably large R.
Step 3:
We now move to period 1, noting that in period 2 the CBFS will always play a mixed
strategy in the form of q2 ∈ (0, 1); this establishes the relation l2 = 1− 2pc1−p − i1. We
now only have to show that q1 = 0 and q1 = 1 are not possible:
1. q1 = 0, which requires that l1 < 1−
2pc
1−p − i1. Using condition (4.A.1) we can set
up a necessary condition for l1:
l1 =
βE[Π2] + R− 1− (φ(i1) − i1)
2(R− 1)
< l2. (4.A.13)
We claim that this condition cannot hold if φ(·) convex enough, since i1 will be
too low to sustain an l1 below l2. This requires that dl1di1 < 0, for which we apply















This equation is negative for sufficiently convex φ(·). Also, i1 will decrease to-
wards k when φ(·) is very convex, which means that l2 is fixed by k. Thus, if i1
decreases towards k, l1 increases and will be larger than l2 for plausible param-
eter values.
2. q1 = 1, leading to l1 > 1 −
2pc
1−p − i1 and i1 = 1 −
T
R−1 , which cannot be an
equilibrium as we have shown above where q2 = 1.
This establishes that no pure strategies are possible for the CBFS: {q1,q2} ∈ (0, 1) is
the only strategy sustainable in equilibrium.
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Proof of Proposition 4.2:
As stated in the text, an interior mixed strategy equilibrium always exists. As we
have shown in proposition 1, q1,q2 ∈ (0, 1), which means that l1 = 1− 2pc1−p − i1 and
l2 = 1−
2pc
1−p − i1, establishing that l1 = l2.







(−φ ′(i1) + (1− q1)β
∂E[Π2]
∂φ
) − (x1 + (1− x1)q1)φ
′′(i1)
− (x1 + (1− x1)q1)βp
∂x2
∂i1
φ ′(i2)) < 0. (4.A.15)
This means that the bank will choose capital to be at the minimum required, establish-
ing part 1 of proposition 2.
When φ(·) is less convex and R is high enough, the FOCs on l1 and l2 will be negative








(1− q1)((1− l1) + pβ(x2 + (1− x2)q2)(1+ i2 − l2))







(1− q2)(1+ i2 − l2) − (x2 + (1− x2)q2)
)
. (4.A.17)
These expressions are negative when i1 is relatively high, establishing that the bank
chooses liquidity at l in both periods, establishing part 2 of proposition 2.
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Proof of Proposition 4.3:
To gauge the effect of T on q1 and q2, we can employ the Implicit Function Theorem
to determine the sign of the derivatives of q1 and q2 w.r.t T . Using equations (4.A.1)
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(V(l2, i2i1) −φ(i2) − T) + (1− x2)(R− 1)) < 0. (4.A.21)
As both the numerator and denominator are negative, dq1dT and
dq2
dT are positive.
The effect of c is more straightforward: as c only appears in the indifference condition
of the CBFS, l1 = l2 = 1−
2pc
1−p − i1, we can substitute this condition for l1 and l2 in
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As again both the numerator and denominator are negative, dq1dc and
dq2
dc are positive.
Proof of Proposition 4.4:
An increase in p works through the same channel as an increase in c: we substitute 1−
2pc
1−p − i1 for l1 and l2 in their respective FOCs, and then calculate the total derivative











































c > 0. (4.A.29)
An increase in β increases the importance of period 2 for the banker, so he will want
to increase E[Π2]. As β affects the marginal benefit of i1 positively (
dMB(i1)
dβ > 0,
see equation (4.A.2)), without affecting its costs, the bank will want to increase i1 to


































(1− q1)E[Π2] > 0, (4.A.32)
so dq1dβ > 0 and
dq2
dβ > 0.
Through the CBFS indifference condition l1 = l2 = 1−
2pc
1−p − i1 we can also see that
l1 and l2 decline as i1 increases. Therefore, an increase in β increases i1, q1 and q2
and decreases l1 and l2, as required.

5
A S H E E P I N W O L F ’ S C L O T H I N G : C A N A C E N T R A L B A N K
A P P E A R T O U G H E R T H A N I T I S ?
5.1 introduction
In the run-up to the financial crisis the doctrine of “constructive ambiguity” has been
popular with both monetary and financial stability policymakers. This means that
institutions such as central banks would not be clear about their exact goals and
instruments, leaving financial institutions and other agents in the dark about their
intentions. Policymakers could thus follow ambiguity strategies that kept financial
institutions, such as banks, vigilant and prudent.
With the advent of the crisis, however, this ambiguity has largely disappeared. Cen-
tral banks and governments have intervened heavily in banks and financial markets.
The case of Bear Stearns in March 2008 is a prominent example: while many believed
this bank would not be assisted, it was the Federal Reserve Bank of New York who
aided JP Morgan in taking over the troubled investment bank. This raised confidence,
so the financial world assumed that the same would happen when Lehman Brothers
faced problems six months later. The crash that followed Lehman’s collapse prompted
the authorities to ascertain that they were standing ready to assist other banks: ambi-
guity went out the window.
Jeffrey Lacker, president of the Richmond Fed, said as much when he stated that
“the difficult dilemmas that policy makers faced in the fall of 2008 were in part
the legacy of a financial safety net policy that ultimately proved unworkable. Often
referred to as ‘constructive ambiguity’, this approach encouraged financial firms and
their creditors to behave as if they were not protected [...] while policymakers actually
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were standing ready to act in a crisis.”1 The elaborate assistance programmes by the
US authorities (such as TARP, but also Quantitative Easing) and the Fed’s intentions
to keep the interest rate low also indicate that the ambiguity doctrine has been largely
abandoned, at least for systemically relevant banks.
In Europe, recent ECB actions indicate that the same view prevails here. Although
the ECB does not have an explicit financial stability mandate and has not announced
its objective (Vollmer, 2009), its actions and statements are a good indicator of its
objectives. The liquidity operations in 2011 and 2012, dominated by two large Long
Term Refinancing Operations (LTRO), already indicated in which direction the ECB
is going. The statements by ECB president Draghi did the rest: “Within our mandate,
the ECB is ready to do whatever it takes to preserve the euro. And believe me, it will
be enough.”2 While this explicitly refers to the Eurozone crisis, it also pertains to the
banking sector as these are closely linked.
On the other hand, ambiguity could still be applied to interactions with smaller or
less systemically relevant banks. In Eijffinger and Nijskens (2012) analyze the effects
of a CB pursuing an ambiguity strategy in this type of situation. Here, we assume
that a central bank (CB) has the credibility to follow an ambiguous Lender of Last
Resort (LLR) strategy. However, as follows from the observations above, this is not an
obvious assumption in all situations and it deserves more exploration. In what follows,
I will provide a background for the CB’s credibility. As proposed by Goodfriend and
Lacker (1999), CB reputation (and the ensuing credibility) can act as a commitment
device for a constructive ambiguity strategy. Reputation effects play a large role in
LLR policy: they can act as a disciplining device for a CB that either bails out more
often (forbearance) or less often (too strict) than it should (Barro and Gordon, 1983). In
other words, reputation can help distinguishing good quality from bad quality central
banks (Boot and Thakor, 1993).
1 Lacker, Jeffrey M. (2010), “Reflections on Economics, Policy and the Financial Crisis”, Speech at the Ken-
tucky Economic Association, September 24, www.richmondfed.org/press_room/speeches/president_
jeff_lacker/2010/lacker_speech_20100924.cfm
2 Draghi, Mario (2012), Speech at the Global Investment Conference, London, July 26, www.ecb.int/press/
key/date/2012/html/sp120726.en.html
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In the model this is formalized by allowing for different types of CB: tough or
lenient. The bank in our model does not know this, but has to infer it from observing
the actions of the CB. It then updates its beliefs about the CB’s nature, according
to the methodology in Backus and Driffill (1985). Operating in this framework the
central bank can build a reputation for toughness by pursuing a mixed bailout strategy:
constructive ambiguity. This does, however, require that the costs of a bank failure
are not extremely high: it is not possible to circumvent a Too-Big-to-Fail (or systemic
banking) problem with ambiguity. On the other hand, the CB’s ambiguity strategy
incentivizes the bank to hold more reserves, thereby alleviating bank failure problems.
This ambiguity strategy is not without risk for the CB: there is always a risk that its
reputation is blown, after which it has to resort to a blanket guarantee strategy. This is
of course very costly. This risk will be mitigated by an increase in bank capital buffers
and, quite straightforwardly, by a high initial reputation. The latter can come in the
form of political independence, as has been argued profoundly in the central banking
literature. Furthermore, charging a penalty rate on bailout assistance limits the need
for reputation building. Conversely, when the government stands ready to bail out
any bank the bank will behave less prudently; the CB will have to exert more effort to
build up its reputation.
The next section will start with a review of related literature on central banking,
transparency and the Lender of Last Resort. Its second part presents a more elaborate
intuitive introduction to the model.
5.2 institutional details of ambiguity
Why does a central bank (CB) want to resort to constructive ambiguity? As demon-
strated in Eijffinger and Nijskens (2012), it may not be able to stick to a credible no-
bailout policy. However, always bailing out (a blanket guarantee) causes moral hazard
and is very costly. A strategy of ambiguity is the solution to this difficult choice. Be-
low I will argue that ambiguity requires a certain reputation, facilitated by uncertainty
about the CB’s objective. A short review of the literature on central bank transparency,
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ambiguity and its lender of last resort function will serve as an introduction to the
model. After that the institutional setup of the model will be described.
5.2.1 Literature
In this paper I combine two strands of central banking literature: transparency and
the Lender of Last Resort (LLR) function. Central bank transparency has mainly been
considered in a monetary policy context in the literature. However, the degree of trans-
parency also affects the financial stability objective of a central bank (see e.g. Van der
Cruijsen et al. (2012) and Liedorp et al. (2011)).
Of course these policy areas are different: monetary policy decisions are taken
quite regularly, while widespread financial crises happen infrequently. The scope
for communication and transparency may therefore be limited in the financial
stability context; learning about a central bank’s objective is difficult when decisions
are observed infrequently. However, individual banking problems that require CB
involvement occur more often, giving banks more opportunities to learn about the
CB’s objective. In these cases following a strategy of ambiguity can be quite useful, as
it can influence the bank’s inference process.
The literature on central bank transparency has been comprehensively summarized
by Geraats (2002), who outlines the theoretical considerations of CB transparency and
touches briefly upon the empirics. A more recent overview, also incorporating newer
theoretical contributions in the field of coordination and learning, can be found in Van
der Cruijsen and Eijffinger (2007). An overview of the main empirical contributions to
the transparency literature is provided by Blinder et al. (2008); these authors also elab-
orately discuss the monetary policy recommendations following from the empirical
results.
Regarding central bank reputation Barro and Gordon (1983) can be seen as the sem-
inal contribution. They propose that a government that inflates excessively to boost
output can be restrained by having a credible reputation. However, the authors do not
make explicit how this reputation should be achieved. Backus and Driffill (1985) have
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modeled the reputation building process by allowing for uncertainty about a CB’s ob-
jective in a binary inflation choice setting. The public updates its belief about the CB’s
objective by observing whether the CB inflates or not. Barro (1986) has generalized
this by allowing for reputation building in a continuous choice setting. In addition
to uncertainty about the CB’s objective, Cukierman and Meltzer (1986) propose that
the CB has imperfect control over inflation. Control errors may hinder the public in
updating its belief about the CB’s type.
More recently, Faust and Svensson (2001) have extended this model structure by
allowing for a more general error distribution, at the cost of more complexity. They
find that transparency is, on average, socially beneficial. Sibert (2006) obtains a similar
result in a simple 2 period model. A surprising result from both studies is that full
transparency, i.e. revealing the exact objective function of the CB, leads to suboptimally
high inflation. As the CB does not care about its reputation anymore, it will not try to
build one by pursuing low inflation. A similar result (albeit in a different setting) will
obtain in the formal model that is explained in section 5.3.
Empirically, Dincer and Eichengreen (2009) have updated the measurement of
central bank transparency by Eijffinger and Geraats (2006). However, their focus lies
on monetary policy communication, which is not the focus of my analysis. Born et al.
(2011) have taken a different approach by measuring the effect of communication
targeted at financial stability. By analyzing communication channels such as speeches,
interviews and reports on financial stability they find that transparency is generally
preferable. However, in crisis times (such as those in the model below) it pays to be
less transparent as to not trigger bank runs or market panics.
The other literature related to this study is that on the Lender of Last Resort and
Bailouts. A comprehensive survey of this literature is provided by Freixas and Parigi
(2008). I will focus on those contributions that discuss time inconsistency and construc-
tive ambiguity.
The time inconsistency problem is a particularly pervasive one in bank crisis man-
agement. Ex ante, a financial regulator would like to be tough to discourage a bank
from behaving imprudently. When a crisis has hit, however, it is optimal for the reg-
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ulator or government to save the bank and avoid the problems associated with bank
failure. Acharya and Yorulmazer (2007) analyze a situation in which banks want to
become more correlated to profit from a bail out. The reason is that the regulator will
not want to bail out a single bank ex ante, but it will save multiple banks if they
fail together: a Too-Many-to-Fail problem. Banks will thus make similar investments
and thus increase the risk that they fail together, after which the regulator will res-
cue them. Additional to the regulator’s problem, Chari and Kehoe (2009) find that
also private creditors suffer from a time inconsistency problem. As they would like to
avoid bankruptcy (and losing everything) they renegotiate their contracts ex post. This
creates incentives for bankers to behave imprudently.
The empirical literature on bailout expectations confirms these theoretical notions.
Dam and Koetter (2012), for instance, apply a structural model of political factors to
the German banking system and find that bailout expectations indeed increase risk
taking. Regarding the US Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) and its signaling ef-
fects, Black and Hazelwood (2012) find that large banks assisted through this program
take significantly higher risks in new lending efforts. This result relates to the notion of
Too-Big-to-Fail: in a study of bank’s tail risk, Knaup and Wagner (2012) find that this
tail risk is lower for big banks. They take this as an indication of an implicity bailout
subsidy by the authorities. Relatedly, Carbo-Valverde et al. (2011) find that complex
banks enjoy more safety net benefits as measured by the value of a put option on bank
value. Finally, bailout expectations do not only increase risk taking by those banks pro-
tected by the bailout, but through increased competition can lead unprotected banks
to take more risk (Gropp et al., 2011).
On the other hand, there is also evidence of a reputation building effect in the
context of official bailouts (i.e. by the IMF). Dell’Ariccia et al. (2006), for instance,
find that the "non-bailout" of Russia in 1998 increased sovereign debt spreads. They
interpret this as a decrease in bailout expectations. It can also be seen as a confirmation
of the “constructive ambiguity” doctrine3.
3 Constructive ambiguity may have been the aim of the United States government when they did not assist
Lehman Brothers; the outcome of this policy was probably not intended.
5.2 institutional details of ambiguity 119
This notion of ambiguity has been emphasized in the Lender of Last Resort (LLR)
literature by, among others, Freixas (1999). He argues that, to limit bank leverage, a CB
acting as LLR should resort to a mixed strategy in its bailout decision. Goodhart and
Huang (2005) employ a dynamic model to argue that, indeed, a CB should employ
ambiguity by not letting the bank know the exact conditions under which it will be
assisted; this limits moral hazard.
Several authors have recently embraced the idea of Knightian uncertainty: not only
the CB’s bailout probability, but also its distribution is unknown. In this situation
agents will resort to maximin optimization: they optimize under the worst case
scenario. Cukierman and Izhakian (2011) find that a sudden ex post increase in
bailout uncertainty, e.g. after the failure of Lehman Brothers in 2008, leads to a higher
interest rate, higher default rates and even a dry-up of credit markets. In contrast, ex
ante low bailout uncertainty increase moral hazard through higher leverage which
makes a “Lehman”-type event even more destructive. Vinogradov (2012) analyzes
a similar case: uncertainty about bailout mechanisms can create a misalignment of
beliefs between depositors and banks. This disrupts credit markets when aggregate
risk is high.
In section 5.3 I combine the insights from the literature on central bank transparency
and reputation with those from the Lender of Last Resort and bank bailout literature
in a formal model. Below, I provide an intuitive approach to this model, which is used
to study the effect of (less) central bank transparency on bailout expectations and bank
liquidity choices.
5.2.2 Introducing the model
In the model, there is one bank that operates in an environment with uncertainty
about the Lender of Last Resort’s (LLR) objective function. The LLR is modeled as a
central bank (CB) with a mandate for financial stability. However, in this mandate the
CB’s loss function is not very specifically defined. The bank only knows that there are
different types of loss functions, that can make the CB either tough or lenient. If the
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CB is tough, it will never assist a bank that runs into liquidity problems; the bank will
have to obtain liquidity on its own. This type of CB will be referred to as a Hawk, a
term used in the monetary policy literature to refer to an inflation-averse policymaker.
A Dove, on the other hand, is more lenient than a Hawk and will be more willing to
assist the bank. In fact, a Dove will always want to rescue the bank (absent reputational
concerns): a blanket guarantee. The disadvantage of this policy is that it is very costly.
These costs can be overcome by making use of the uncertainty about the CB’s mandate:
if a bank does not know with 100% certainty that the CB is a Dove, it has to take into
account the possibility that it is not rescued if necessary. This provides scope for a
constructive ambiguity policy by the CB through its reputation for toughness.
It has to be noted that the “type” of CB can be interpreted more generally as
the overall policy inclination of its executive board. This means that it reflects the
proportion of Hawks and Doves on the board. If the board consists of predominantly
Doves, the CB is referred to as a Dove; if Hawks have the majority, the stance of the
CB will be Hawkish. In any case, the bank does not know the exact proportion of
Hawks and Doves in the board, and thus does not know the overall policy inclination
of the CB.
The bank in the model faces liquidity shocks resulting from a financial crisis, as
depositors withdraw their money. In this crisis the interbank market is not functioning.
Therefore, if the bank is not liquid enough it can only go to the CB for liquidity. Only
by observing the CB’s past actions the bank can find out whether it is dealing with
a Hawk or a Dove. This will be analyzed in a repeated game setup over two time
periods, so the bank can base its current period’s decisions on the previous periods’
results. It will have certain beliefs on the CB’s nature, which will be updated on the
basis of Bayes’ rule as in Backus and Driffill (1985); equilibrium in the model will then
be determined by these beliefs and both players’ actions.
This stylized situation relates to the policy problem that the world’s Lenders of Last
Resort currently face. Should they act as Hawks, which keeps their reputation high
but lowers bailout expectations at the risk of too many failures? Should they act as
5.3 model 121
Doves, avoiding failures but increasing the scope for moral hazard due to a decrease
in reputation? Or is it even possible to return to a situation of constructive ambiguity,
and under which conditions?
The current situation in Europe and the ECB’s actions during this crisis seem to
indicate that the ECB currently has a more Dovish stance, not only in monetary policy,
but also in financial stability. The recent comments by its president, Mario Draghi, have
provided even more support for this indication. In the United States the situation is
similar: the Federal Reserve, for example, has indicated that interest rates will remain
low until mid-20154.
5.3 model
As stated above there are two players in the model: a bank and a central bank (CB)
that operates as the Lender of Last Resort (LLR). The bank operates in an environment
with uncertainty about the CB’s loss function: it does not know the size of the CB’s
cost of bank failure θ. This parameter represents all costs that arise from bank failure
and that are attributed to the CB’s action (or inaction). In a broader sense it can also
be seen as the net costs of failure, i.e. the difference between the costs of failure and
those of a bailout.
A tough central bank (Hawk), will never rescue a bank in liquidity problems as its
cost of assistance always surpasses that of bank failure. In other words, a Hawk’s θ,
which is denoted by θH, is lower than or equal to zero. A lenient central bank (Dove),
on the other hand, has a positive θD. This means that under some circumstances it
will want to assist a bank with liquidity problems and, as we will see below, does this
with a positive probability qt.
Clearly, this characterization of central bank incentives is strongly simplified and
perhaps at odds with reality. In practice a central bank will always have some motiva-
tion to assist a bank with liquidity, especially when the bank is fundamentally sound.
4 Federal Reserve Board (2012), “Why are interest rates being kept at a low level?”, http://www.
federalreserve.gov/faqs/money_12849.htm
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However, some CBs (particularly those with good reputation) may be less willing
to assist than others. This can depend on the extent to which they are responsible
for financial stability; this is proxied by our parameter θ. The assumptions on this
parameter can be generalized such that θH > 0 and a Hawk is also willing to assist
an illiquid bank. However, as long as a θH is sufficiently below θD, our results will
remain qualitatively unchanged.




θH = 0 with probability λH
θD > 0 with probability 1− λH
(5.1)
where λH < 1 and no further assumptions on the size of λH are made. Furthermore,
λH is perfectly observable and known to all players at the start of the game. The
realization of θ takes place before the game between the bank and the CB starts, and
is known only to the CB. After θ has realized, the bank and the CB play a repeated
game.
5.3.1 Bank details





where d denotes deposits, k is capital, lt represents liquid reserves and at is the
amount invested in risky assets. These will be explained in more detail below.
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The capital structure of the bank is taken as given, meaning that d+ k = 1. Deposits
are completely insured and thus require an interest rate equal to the risk free rate,
which is normalized to 0. Capital is provided by the bank owner and can act as a
buffer in case of losses. Furthermore, as we will see later it will also make the bank
less vulnerable to liquidity shocks.
On the asset side we first find liquid reserves lt. These can be seen as a storage
technology gross return 1 or, equivalently, a net return equal to the risk free rate of 0.
Finally, the bank can invest at = 1− lt into a risky investment opportunity returning
R > 1 with probability p > 12 and zero otherwise. As we are mainly interested in the
net returns, it is useful to define r = R− 1 as the net return in case of success.
Since the balance sheet size and its liability side are fixed, the bank only chooses its
assets. This amounts to choosing liquid reserves lt. As the bank faces limited liability,
this will lead to the following expected end-of-period profit in autarky:
Π(lt) = p(r(1− lt) + k). (5.2)
However, the bank may be subject to a liquidity shock x̃t in an intermediate stage.
This shock is distributed as follows:
x̃t =

x with probability µ
0 with probability 1− µ
(5.3)
Its realization leads to a deposit withdrawal of xd. The size of x and the probability
µ are known ex ante, so the expected value µx is readily calculated. This deposit
withdrawal is no explicit bank run (although it may be the result of a random signal
on bank solvency (Rochet and Vives, 2004), nor a liquidity shock that is required to
continue an investment project as in Holmstrom and Tirole (1998). We want to abstract
from the shock causing solvency problems by itself: if the bank is liquid, it will never
be insolvent as a direct consequence of the liquidity shock.
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Depending on the choice of lt, two situations can emerge after the liquidity shock
(note that the interbank market is not functioning):
1. xd 6 lt: no problem
2. xd > lt: assistance from CB needed
Liquidity assistance then consists of full liquidity replenishment of xd, will only
happen if CB is of type D and can be denied by D for reputational reasons. To simplify
our analysis the CB charges no penalty rate. I will elaborate upon this later in section
5.3.2, in which the CB’s objective will be described.
Knowing that it may or may not be assisted by the CB, the bank will have to
choose its liquid reserves. This amounts to a trade-off between the opportunity cost
of liquidity and the expected gain from being assisted. The bank’s liquidity choice is
a binary one between either being liquid at lt = xd or being illiquid at lt = 0. This
follows from the observation that there is no gain from choosing more than xd (as
the shock size is known), and it is not useful to choose less because this will not help
solving liquidity problems.
Before summarizing the bank’s problem in a value function, a last note about the
resolution process is in order. The bank faces limited liability, which means it loses
only its capital if it fails; this can be due to either illiquidity or insolvency (R = 0). If
the bank fails at any step, it is taken over by the deposit insurance fund and resolved.
In the next period a new banker will be put in place.
However, if the bank survives and R > 0, bank continues to t+ 1. We have estab-
lished that ex ante, the bank can choose to be liquid, which means lt = xd. This hap-
pens with endogenous probability st. In a mixed strategy, we thus have that st ∈ (0, 1).
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BL = pΠ(xd) = p(r(1− xd) + k)
BNLt = pztΠ(0) = pzt(r+ k),
and zt = (1− µ) + µ(1− ρt)qt is the probability that the bank survives until the end
of the period, qt is the CB’s assistance probability, and ρt is CB reputation. The two
latter ones will be detailed in the next section. Note, furthermore, that the bank does
not discount future profits.
As follows from equation (5.4), the bank’s value function Vt depends on the current
probability of assistance by the CB. However, it also depends on the CB’s reputation
explicitly: if the CB has a certain reputation for being tough (ρt > 0), the bank cannot
be sure that it will receive liquidity. Reputation is ultimately determined by the actions
of the CB, according to Bayes’ rule. This exact process will be described in the next
section.
5.3.2 Central Bank liquidity assistance
If a liquidity shock occurs, the Central Bank has to decide whether it assists the bank
or not. Of course, this decision is a trade-off between the costs of (immediate) bank
failure and the expected costs of a liquidity injection. For a H CB, this is a no-brainer:
as its θH = 0, it will never assist a bank. However, for a D CB there is a trade-off. If it
lets the bank fail now (denoted by F), D faces the immediate cost θD. If, on the other
hand, D assists (A) it may incur the cost c and lose its injection xd if R = 0. As the H
CB does not take any action, it is left out of the analysis from now on. The D CB will
be referred to as just the CB.
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The per period loss functions for the CB are:
Assistance: LAt = (1− p)(xd+ θD),
Failure: LFt = θD.
The CB’s objective is thus to choose between A and F every period. Note also that, as
mentioned before, the CB does not charge a penalty rate on its liquidity assistance.
Several authors have demonstrated this can lead to gambling and thus more moral
hazard (Castiglionesi and Wagner, 2011; Repullo, 2005). Furthermore, it may lead to
forbearance by the CB (Kahn and Santos, 2005). In section 5.5 this assumption will be
relaxed.
The CB also cares about its reputation. This notion has been introduced into the
monetary policy literature by, among others, Barro and Gordon (1983) and has been
formalized explicitly by Backus and Driffill (1985). In this model reputation is modeled
as in Backus and Driffill (1985). As stated above, ρt is the CB’s reputation for toughness.
Even if it is a Dove, it can build reputation by acting as a Hawk. Reputation is updated






0 if A or ρt = 0
(5.5)
where qt is the probability that the CB bails out. This means that reputation can only
increase if the probability of bailout qt is positive. When qt = 1 and the CB’s decision
is A, its reputation will be blown. In other words, reputation building is risky, as a
bailout action will immediately bring ρt to zero.
It follows that reputation in the next period (ρt+1) neatly summarizes the conse-
quences of current CB actions. If a bailout occurs, ρt+1 = 0, but if a bailout does not
occur ρt+1 > 0. The CB’s future value function Λt+1 depends on ρt+1, so there are
two possibilities: Λt+1(0) and Λt+1(ρt+1). The CB’s current value function consists of
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current and future loss functions and depends on qt and ρt+1 (again, there is no time
discounting). Its objective is to minimize this value function:
min
qt









From the above equation it can be seen that if qt = 1 the CB will completely blow its
reputation, ρt+1 = 0 and Λt+1(0) will prevail at t+ 1. Furthermore, the situation in
which the bank is liquid (w.p. st) is not included. In this case, there is no need for the
CB to step in so its loss equals zero by definition.
5.3.3 Summary and sequence
The analysis that follows will involve a two-period version of the model described
above. This enables us to study the effects of reputation on bank rescue and liquidity
decisions, without needlessly complicating the analysis. One important assumption
needs to be made:
Assumption 5.1: θD >
(1−p)
p xd ≡ θD.
This inequality can be deduced from the observation that a Dove CB does not care
about its reputation anymore in the last period; it will only weigh LA2 against L
F
2 in
its bailout decision. When assumption 1 is satisfied the CB cares enough about bank
failure to always rescue in the last period (t = 2): q2 = 1 5. This indicates, as assumed,
that a Dove CB’s only reason for not bailing out the bank is its reputation in the next
period.
Knowing this, the sequence of events can be summarized in Figure 5.1. It is
important to note that if the CB bails out, its reputation is reduced to zero. The bank
then chooses to be illiquid in the next period, as it knows it will be bailed out with
5 This is a normalization assumption, and perhaps not an innocuous one. However, it has intuitive appeal:
a Dove would like to assist the bank, but does not do so solely for reputational reasons. Moreover, it
greatly simplifies our analysis as solving the game in the last period is now relatively easy. Furthermore,
for a sufficiently large θD it will be the case that q2 > q1 always.
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certainty6.
Figure 5.1: Sequence of events
t = 0 t = 1 t = 2
Nature









ρ > 0 :
F
ρ = 0 :
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1. Bank gets V1




1. Bank gets 0





In solving the model, it is convenient to start at the right side of Figure 5.1 and employ
backward induction. The solution concept will be that of a Bayesian Nash equilibrium,
or a sequential equilibrium.
6 Note that, as stated above, we do not incorporate discounting into the model. However, its effects would
be quite straightforward: as the future matters less for both players, they will exert less effort. This means
that the bank would be less liquid and the CB would choose a lower bailout probability, leading to less
reputation building.
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As it is already established that a D CB will always bail out in period 2 it is only









BL = pΠ(xd) = p(r(1− xd) + k)
BNL2 = pz2Π(0) = pz2(r+ k),
and z2 = 1− µρ2 since q2 = 1. In maximizing this, the bank only takes into account
the consequences for the current period, taking as given the decision of the CB and
the decisions from the previous period.
An important summary statistic from the previous period is the CB’s reputation,
which is determined by equation (5.5). Since we have two periods only, ρ1 = λH and
ρ2 =
λH
λH + (1− q1)(1− λH)
. (5.7)
The bank knows this, and bases its decision for period 2, i.e. its choice of s2, on this
ρ2. It’s second period first order condition (FOC) for an s2 ∈ (0, 1) is:
rxd = ρ2µ(r+ k), (5.8)
which means that there is a critical ρ2, which I will call ρ∗2, that makes this hold. I
will elaborate upon this below. What is important to observe here is that this FOC is
negative when ρ2 = 0: s2 = 0.
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At t = 1, the central bank’s reputation is built. The CB knows that if q1 = 1, ρ2=0
and its reputation is blown: this will lead to Λ2(ρ2) = Λ2(0). It will thus take this into
account in its objective function:
min
q1













(1− p)(xd+ θD) if ρ2 < ρ∗2
(1− s2)(1− p)(xd+ θD) if ρ2 = ρ∗2
0 if ρ2 > ρ∗2.
(5.9)
This reflects that if reputation is high enough, the bank will choose to be liquid and
thus the CB faces no costs in period 2. However, if reputation is too low (eg. 0), the CB
will face full liquidity assistance costs. Note that ρ2 is determined by q1 according to
Bayes’ rule in equation (5.7).




L + (1− s1)B
NL
1 + p(s1 + (1− s1)z1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Continuation probability
V2
where z1 = 1−µ+µ(1− ρ1)q1. The choice of q1 is taken as given by the bank, as well
as its own choice at t = 2.
In the next section I will summarize both players’ decisions and elaborate on the pos-
sible equilibria that can arise, depending on the assumptions about initial reputation
ρ1 = λH and θD.
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5.4.1 Sequential equilibrium
We know that under our assumptions at t = 2, a Dove CB will always rescue the bank:








q∗1 ∈ (0, 1) if θD = θ∗D
0 if θD < θ∗D.
(5.10)
This means that the ultimate decision by the CB depends on θD, i.e. the weight that it
attaches to bank failure, and, through equilibrium s∗2, on its future reputation ρ2.
The bank’s actions in both periods are summarized by the following two equations:
s1 =







s∗1 ∈ (0, 1) if ρ1 = ρ∗1(q∗1)






1 if ρ2 > ρ∗2 ≡
rxd
µ(r+k)
s∗2 ∈ (0, 1) if ρ2 = ρ∗2
0 if ρ2 < ρ∗2.
(5.12)
These tell us that the bank’s choice of liquidity at t = 1 depends on initial reputation
ρ1 = λH and the CB’s bailout probability q1. The choice of liquidity at t = 2 depends
on future reputation ρ2 only, as this is a summary statistic of what has happened
before t = 2.
Before moving to the different equilibria that can occur, another parameter assump-
tion is needed to make sure that p∗2 < 1. This means that the bank can be liquid or
follow a mixed strategy in equilibrium in period 2. If ρ∗2 would be larger than one, we
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would encounter the strange situation in which reputation can never be high enough
to make the bank liquid at t = 2. The following assumption guarantees this will not
happen.
Assumption 5.2: rxd < µ(r+ k)
where rxd are the opportunity costs of being liquid and µ(r + k) represents the
expected gain from being liquid. In case of autarky or when the reputation of the CB
ρ2 = 0, the bank thus prefers being liquid to being illiquid (and risking failure in case
of a shock). Thus, the only reason for a bank to not keep liquid reserves is because it
may be bailed out by the Central Bank.
As I have mentioned before, different situations can arise for different values of the
failure cost and reputation parameters. These are depicted in Figure 5.2, and they will
be considered in turn below.
5.4.2 A badly concealed Dove
As stated in the top area of Figure 5.2, there are cases for which reputation building is
not possible. These are described in proposition 5.1 and explained below.
Proposition 5.1: if λH = 0 or θD > θD ≡ 1−pp−1/2xd it is not possible for the CB to build a
reputation (such that ρ2 > 0) in equilibrium.
Proof: see appendix. 
When the CB’s reputation in period 1 is zero or the failure costs θD are very high,
it is not possible to build a reputation. The reason behind this is that θD is known; if
this is higher than θD the CB will rescue irrespective of whether the bank is liquid or
not. As this θD is also observable to the bank, it will choose never to be liquid (s2 = 0)
and the CB has no choice but bailing out the bank if necessary. Naturally, if the CB’s
initial reputation is already zero (λH = 0), it will never be able to make a bank believe
it is tough since there is no uncertainty left about its nature.
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(q∗1 ∈ (0, 1))
s1 = 0
s2 ∈ (0, 1)
s1 = 1































Ambiguity (q∗1 ∈ (0, 1))
Note: qt and st denote the probability of bailout and the probability of being liquid in period t; qt
indicates the CB’s equilibrium strategy, while st indicates the bank’s strategy. Each area between the
(dashed) lines represents a unique equilibrium. The areas at the top, the top-right and the right represent
situations in which reputation building is not possible, there is no equilibrium, or reputation building
is not necessary, respectively. Finally, on the dashed lines we have multiple equilibria (ME); these are
special cases.
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As it is now established that reputation building is not possible for θD > θD, I will
restrict attention to those cases in which θD ∈ (θD, θD).
5.4.3 All Central Banks are very tough
The right-hand side of Figure 5.2 shows that there are also values of ρ1 = λH for which
reputation building is not necessary.
Proposition 5.2: if λH ∈ (ρ∗2, 1) reputation building is not necessary, so q∗1 = 0 and s∗1 =
s∗2 = 1.
Proof: see appendix. 
If the CB is already seen as very tough, it is not necessary to build a reputation by
choosing a positive bailout probability. The bank will therefore always be liquid in
both periods without the CB having to build a reputation with a positive q1.
Since the cases with very high failure costs and very high reputation are proven to
be static, I will now only treat situations in which ρ1 < ρ∗2 and θ ∈ (θD, θD).
5.4.4 Building a reputation for toughness
In the case of intermediate failure costs, i.e. θ ∈ (θD, θD), it is possible for the CB
to build a reputation by playing a strategy of “constructive ambiguity”. This means
that the central banker will, in equilibrium, choose a positive bailout probability that
is below one. A high central bank reputation will make the bank more inclined to
keep its own liquid reserves, as it is less certain of assistance by the CB. This will be
explored below. However, it is convenient to first discuss the initial condition of the
model, also called initial reputation.
The CB’s initial reputation matters for its ability as well as its need to build a future
reputation, which in turn determines the future liquidity position of the bank. How-
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ever, it also determines whether the bank will be liquid or not in the current period:
if initial reputation is low, the bank will choose not to be liquid and trust on the CB’s
willingness to provide liquidity. If initial reputation is high, the bank will play a safer
strategy and keep its own liquid reserves to cope with the liquidity shock.
To distinguish between low and high initial reputation, I have to define a threshold.
This threshold determines for which ρ1 the bank chooses to be liquid or not in the first
period, and is stated in the lemma below.
Lemma 5.1: there exists a unique threshold for λH(= ρ1), called ρ∗1, above which the bank
chooses s1 = 1. Below this threshold s1 = 0.
Proof: see appendix. 
Using this lemma and the results from the previous sections it is straightforward to
state proposition 5.3. This states that reputation building is possible and worthwhile
but initial reputation also matters.











∈ (0, 1) in period 2.
The proof for this proposition follows from the first order conditions in equations
(5.10), (5.11) and (5.12) (assuming θD ∈ (θD, θD)) and Lemma 1. 
For a low enough initial reputation (left-hand side of Figure 5.2) it is thus the case
that the central bank’s reputation is too low to make the bank liquid in the current
period. Building a reputation is costly, as follows from equation (5.7): ρ2 increases
with q1. The CB has to increase its (conjectured) bailout probability to obtain a higher
reputation. This will be anticipated by the bank, which will be less inclined to keep its
own liquid reserves when q1 is higher. As follows from Lemma 1, if reputation is low
enough the bank will choose to hold no reserves at all in period 1.
Nevertheless, as long as initial reputation is positive, it is possible to build a
reputation for toughnesss by pursuing a constructive ambiguity policy. This will make
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the bank liquid with a positive probability in the next period.
On the other hand, if the central bank’s initial reputation λH is high enough (right-
hand side of Figure 5.2) the bank will be liquid in period 1 with certainty. This follows
as a corollary from proposition 5.3.











∈ (0, 1) in period 2.
If the CB’s reputation is high enough, the bank does not expect to be bailed out
with a high probability (q1 is relatively low) so it will keep its own liquid reserves in
period 1. Again, as long as the initial reputation is positive the central bank can build
its future reputation in such a way that the bank is liquid with a positive probability
in the next period.
5.4.5 Border cases
There are several border cases with multiple equilibria and one case in which there is
no equilibrium at all. They are discussed informally below; proofs are available upon
request.
For θ = θD and ρ1 < ρ∗2 the CB will follow a mixed strategy but there are multiple
equilibria at t = 1 for s1; q1 is undetermined. For ρ1 = ρ∗1 we have a equilibria in
only mixed strategies, but s1 is undetermined. For λH = ρ∗2 reputation building is
not necessary (q1 = 0) and s1 = 1, but s2 is undetermined. The case without an
equilibrium arises when both reputation and failure costs are high, i.e. λH > ρ∗2 and
θD > θD. Here, the bank would want to be liquid always because of the CB’s high
initial reputation. However, since failure costs are high, the CB will always want to
bail out. This means, in turn, that being liquid at t = 1 is not the bank’s best response,
and we can thus not have a stable equilibrium.
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5.5 discussion
In the previous section I established that there exists an equilibrium in which the
central bank plays a strategy of “constructive ambiguity” in period 1. The goal of this
strategy is to build a reputation for toughness in the next period, such that the bank is
liquid with a positive probability. This section will explore some of the determinants
of this constructive ambiguity, and extend the model in different directions to make it
more general.
5.5.1 Environment effects
The equilibrium in section 5.4 is parameterized on the CB’s initial reputation λH and
on the bank failure costs θD. However, there are several other environmental parame-
ters that determine the CB’s strategy q1. For future reference, it is useful to restate the







To begin with, its initial reputation not only determines when the central bank can
play constructive ambiguity, but also to which extent it has to do so. Furthermore, the
probability of the liquidity shock, its size and the bank’s capital ratio play a role in de-
termining the CB’s bailout probability. These effects are summarized in the following
proposition.
Proposition 5.4: the CB’s bailout probability q1 decreases with its initial reputation λH and
the probability of the liquidity shock µ, while it increases with the size of the shock. Bank capital
k decreases q1.
The proof for this proposition follows straight from equation (5.13). Regarding






< 0, since the numerator is positive by As-













> 0. Finally, the effect of bank capital is













































Note: parameter values employed in these graphs are r = 20%, k = 8%, µ = 0.3, x = 0.3 and λH = 0.2.
A visual portrayal of the comparative statics is presented in Figure 5.3. The intuition
behind these various effects can be explained by the incentives of the CB and the
bank. The reputation effect is straightforward: if reputation is already high, the CB
does not have to “promise” a high bailout probability to build a reputation. In the
figure we can also see that this effect can ultimately drive q1 to zero: here, λH > ρ∗2
and reputation building is not necessary anymore.
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Equation (5.12) shows that ρ2, which is determined by q1, determines the bank’s
choice of s2. q1 is thus determined at the point of indifference of the bank; this
changes with the parameters. Specifically, the probability of the liquidity shock, µ,
decreases the critical reputation level ρ∗2 meaning that less reputation building is
necessary and q1 is lower. The size of the shock, however, has the opposite effect: it
increases the opportunity costs of holding liquidity (since a higher liquidity buffer is
needed) for the bank. Therefore, the bank is less willing to hold liquidity on its own
and a higher reputation (i.e. higher ρ2 and thus higher q1) is necessary to make the
bank liquid at t = 2. Finally, the capital effect is more direct: when the bank’s capital
ratio increases, the bank owner has a higher stake and will thus be more willing to
hold liquidity. Hence, the CB does not have to put much effort in reputation building
and q1 can be lower.
The analysis above indicates that high initial reputation, a high shock probability
and a high bank capital buffer lead to a low bailout probability, meaning that they
decrease the need for reputation building. However, I have also shown that the size of
the shock increases the need for reputation building because the bank’s opportunity
costs of liquidity increase. In the next section I will elaborate on the possibility to
increase the opportunity costs of not holding liquidity by introducing a penalty rate.
5.5.2 Penalty rate
In section 5.3 I have assumed that the CB does not charge a penalty rate on its liquidity
assistance; instead, the bank has to pay the risk free rate (equal to zero). Below I will
relax this assumption: now, the bank has to pay a rate of rP < r on the assistance it
receives from the Central Bank. This has consequences for both the bank (who has to
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pay the penalty) and the CB (who will receive it). These can be summarized with new
per-period profit and loss functions, which will be denoted with a superscript P:
BNL,Pt = p(zt(r+ k) − µ(1− ρt)qtrPxd) (5.14)
LA,Pt = (1− p)(xd(1− rP) + θD). (5.15)
Proceeding by backward induction again shows that Assumption 1 is still confirmed:










L + (1− s2)pB
NL,P
2 .
This optimization leads to a new expression for the threshold for second period repu-
















L + (1− s1)pB
NL,P
1 + p(s1 + (1− s1)z1)V
P
2
7 When rP = 0, ρP2 = ρ
∗
2 and we are back in our basic model.
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taking into account that q1 = qP1 to have an equilibrium at t = 2. This leads to a
restatement of the critical initial reputation λH in equation (5.11), above which the
equilibrium sP1 = 1:
ρP1 (q
P




rxd− µ(r+ k+ VP2 )
µ(r+ k+ V2 − rPxd)
). (5.18)
Finally, the CB’s problem in period 1 also changes (note that LF does not change):
min
q1












As in the original model, an interior q∗1 requires that the FOC from this optimization
is zero. The accompanying sP2 is:
sP2 =
p
1−pθD − xd(1− rP)
θD + xd(1− rP)
. (5.19)
The main question I ask is: will a penalty rate increase or decrease the need for
reputation building? Another interesting one is whether the bank will be more or less
liquid as a consequence. The answers to these questions are summarized below.
Proposition 5.5: a penalty rate rP > 0 decreases the need for reputation building by the CB,
so qP1 < q
∗
1. Furthermore, the introduction of a penalty rate makes the bank liquid more often
at t = 2 and for a larger range of initial reputation λH at t = 1.
Proof: see appendix. 
This result means that a penalty rate is indeed effective in making the bank more
liquid and relieving the central bank of building a reputation through a high q1 and
thus a high chance of having to bailout. Two effects are at play: the bank’s expected
costs of a bailout increase (in the basic model they were zero) and the CB’s expected
loss from a bailout decreases. The former effect dominates, decreasing the CB’s bailout
probability and increasing the bank’s willingness to be liquid.
Note, however, that I focus solely on liquidity considerations. If the bank were also
able to choose the quality of its investment there would be scope for moral hazard
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by the banker as in Ratnovski (2009). In that case there can be a negative effect of
penalty rates, as they may lead to gambling. For a more detailed investigation of this
phenomenon see Repullo (2005) or Castiglionesi and Wagner (2011).
5.5.3 Government bailout
During (and after) the financial crisis central banks have not operated by themselves.
In case of severe bank problems, such as insolvencies, national governments (and
fiscal authorities in general) have provided capital assistance or guarantees to keep
banks alive. The knowledge that the fiscal authorities were standing by to assist in
times of crisis has altered incentives of banks, but perhaps also those of central banks.
This can be incorporated in the model in the following way. As investigated in
Eijffinger and Nijskens (2011) there is a Fiscal Authority (FA) that assists the bank if
a central bank does not provide it with liquidity. The FA can do this with an outright
capital injection or through a more indirect debt guarantee; what is important is that
the FA will demand a repayment from the bank. The repayment, let us call it g, will
be a part of bank value in case of success at the end of the period: g 6 1. The bank’s
profit function in case of government assistance (denoted by G) looks as follows:
BNL,Gt = p(zt − g(1− zt))(r+ k). (5.20)
This expression is a generalization of our basic model, which is the special case with
g = 1 (full nationalization). Note that g will only have to be paid if the bank does not
survive the liquidity shock, which happens with probability 1− zt. The CB will not
be involved in this, so its loss function is not altered8.
8 This assumption is made for simplicity. Of course, during the financial crisis in 2008 and 2009 many
central bankers were also held accountable for government bailouts (i.e. through parliamentary inves-
tigations as in the Netherlands). However, the monetary costs for these bailouts were attributed to the
fiscal government.
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where it has to be noted that the continuation probability now only depends on p. As
the bank will always be assisted (either by the CB or by the FA) it will only fail if its
investment does not succeed. From this optimization I deduce the new critical value
for the CB’s initial reputation:
ρG1 (q
G







Combining these three equilibrium conditions and comparing them to results of the
basic model leads to the following result.
Proposition 5.6: a government bailout increases the need for reputation building by the CB,
so qG1 > q
∗
1. It also decreases the range of initial reputation values λH for which the bank is
liquid at t = 1.
Proof: see appendix. 
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Indeed, the introduction of a government that can bail out the bank above and
beyond the CB’s efforts will diminish the bank’s incentives to be liquid. This means
that the CB has to exert more effort to build a reputation (q1 has to be higher) to make
the bank liquid in period 2, while initial reputation has to be higher to make the bank
liquid in period 1.
The reason is that the bank now gets an additional chance when the CB does not
provide liquidity; previously, it simply failed in this case. Even though this is costly in
gross terms the bank’s net expected profit increases when there is the possibility to be
bailed out by the government. Only when the government appropriates all bank value
(g = 1, i.e. it nationalizes the bank) will the bank not profit from a government bailout.
As with the case of penalty rates, this result may change when we allow for project
selection or monitoring. In that case, the bank may suffer from a government bailout
if it chooses a low quality project. In Eijffinger and Nijskens (2011) we provide a more
detailed investigation of this case, albeit not in a constructive ambiguity context.
5.6 conclusion
For a central bank with a financial stability mandate, reputation is an important asset.
It can facilitate a policy of ambiguous bailouts, which in turn can motivate banks to
choose prudent asset allocations when facing liquidity shocks.
In a stylized model of the interaction between a central bank and a bank I demon-
strate that reputation and the strength of the financial stability mandate both play
an important role. In particular, for reputation building to be possible the financial
stability mandate should not be too broad: if a bank knows that its failure costs are
very large (eg. because it is Too-Big-to-Fail) the CB cannot build a reputation for
toughness. Also, if its initial reputation is already high the CB does not need to build
it up. The high reputation will lead to a credible no-bailout policy, in response which
the bank is always liquid.
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When a CB is able to build a reputation, it will do so by adjusting its expected
bailout probability. As in Backus and Driffill (1985), reputation building involves a
risk since there is a positive probability that the CB will indeed bail out and blow its
reputation; a risk that has to be taken to convince the bank to be liquid in the future.
This equilibrium bailout probability is affected by changes in environmental vari-
ables. For instance, if the CB’s initial reputation is high, it does not have to take as
much risk to build a reputation in the future. This also holds for the probability of
the liquidity shock and the bank’s capital buffer, which both decrease the bank’s op-
portunity costs of being liquid so the CB has to take less risk to build a reputation.
The shock size, however, increases the bank’s opportunity costs of liquidity and thus
require more reputation building effort from the CB.
I additionally study two possible extensions. When the CB can charge a penalty rate
on its liquidity assistance, the bank will be more willing to be liquid and reputation
building is easier. The other possibility is that there is a fiscal government that bails
out banks who do not receive liquidity from the CB. This means that, de facto, the
bank gets another chance after being left to fail by the CB. This will diminish its
incentives to be liquid and thus the CB has to exert more effort in reputation building.
There are also some limitations of this analysis: I do not consider the bank’s risk
shifting incentives explicitly, and the CB’s bailout decision is only a binary one.
However, comparative statics show that portfolio risk (embodied in the probability of
success) has a positive effect on next period’s liquidity. To fully analyze risk shifting
we should incorporate some private benefits as in i.e. Ratnovski (2009). The binary
choice of bailout can be seen as the choice between assistance or nationalization, in
which the bank owner loses everything and the bank continues with a new owner. It
can be generalized to partial assistance or assistance up to a certain threshold, as in
Eijffinger and Nijskens (2011).
Finally, a discussion of implementability is in order. To begin with, reputation build-
ing and ambiguity are difficult to sustain during a system-wide financial crisis: central
banks and regulators just do not have a choice but save systemically important banks.
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This relates to the comment by Jeffrey Lacker, who states that after the recent finan-
cial crisis ambiguity is no feasible strategy anymore: it may indeed be very hard to
establish such a policy.
However, when dealing with individual bank distress (which occurs more often)
ambiguity may be a desirable feature of central bank (LLR) policy. To allow for this,
we should redesign the financial stability mandate of central banks. A tractable way of
doing this is resorting to less transparency, eg. by not stating explicit goals or actions.
Another possibility is to provide more discretion to central banks in executing their
mandate by not specifying exactly what its objectives are. Yet, it should be noted that
these policy changes will hinder the democratic accountability process; it may prove
to be very difficult to satisfy both credibility and accountability demands.
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5.a appendix : proofs
Proof of Proposition 5.1:
This proof shows that when λH = 0 or θD >
1−p
p−1/2xd, it is not possible to build a
reputation such that ρ2 > 0 in equilibrium.
Let us start by stating the first order conditions (FOC) for both players:
∂V2
∂s2
= µρ2(r+ k) − rxd = 0 (5.A.1)
∂Λ1
∂q1
= (1− s1) (2(1− p)(xd+ θD) − θD − (1− s2)(1− p)(xd+ θD)) = 0. (5.A.2)
As follows from Bayes’ rule in equation (5.7), ρ2 = 0 if λH = 0. If ρ2 = 0, the bank
chooses s2 = 0 as follows from its first order condition (5.A.1): this cannot hold for
ρ2 = 0. Indeed, it is negative. The CB’s FOC will also be negative if s2 = 0, which
means it chooses q1 = 0 (this minimizes its loss).
For θD >
1−p
p−1/2xd, the CB’s FOC is negative for all s2. Therefore, the CB will always
choose q1 = 1 as this minimizes its loss. This in turn will reduce its reputation ρ2
to zero, which causes the bank to choose s2 = 0 as above. As these are both best
responses we have an equilibrium in which the CB chooses q1 = 1 and the bank
chooses s2 = 0 when ρ2 = 0.
Proof of Proposition 5.2:







which holds for q1 = 0 as λH > ρ∗2 and thus the RHS of (5.A.3) is negative.
148 a sheep in wolf’s clothing






which holds since we have assumed θD < θD. As q∗1 = 0, s
∗
1 = 1 too since
ρ∗1(q
∗
1)|q∗1→0 = 0 in equation (5.11).
Proof of Lemma 5.1:
Equation (5.11) in the text shows that s1 = 1 for ρ1 > ρ∗1(q
∗
1). What is left is determin-
ing q∗1 to obtain a threshold ρ
∗
1 that depends only on parameters.
As θ ∈ (θD, θD) we know that q1 ∈ (0, 1). Also, since ρ1 ∈ (0, ρ∗2), we know that
reputation building leads to s2 ∈ (0, 1). These q1 and s2 are uniquely determined
in equilibrium by the model parameters through the CB’s first period FOC (equation













where Y = rxdµ(r+k+V2) . Rearranging this leads to:
ρ1 > ρ
∗
1 ≡ Yρ∗2. (5.A.7)
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Proof of Proposition 5.5:





























this means that qP1 < q
∗
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). Replace qP1 :
λH > ρ
P
1 ≡ ρP2YP, (5.A.10)
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the relative sizes of ρP1 and ρ
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|rP=0 < 0, and that Y
P |rP=0 > 0 and ρ
P
2 |rP=0 > 0. Investigat-




all rP. The conclusion from this exercise is that
dρP1
drP





means the bank is liquid in period t = 1 for a larger range of initial reputation λH.
What remains is determining the probability of being liquid at t = 2. Using
sP2 =
p
1−pθD − xd(1− rP)
θD + xd(1− rP)
(5.A.12)
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so sP2 > s
∗
2 and the penalty rate makes the bank liquid more often in period 2.
Proof of Proposition 5.6:
As in the proof above, the need for CB reputation building follows from ρG2 . From
equation (5.21) in the text I deduce that ρG2 > ρ
∗
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and simplifying these to
ρ1 > ρ
G
1 ≡ ρG2 YG, (5.A.16)
where YG = rxdgµ(r+k) .
Note that ρG1 reduces to ρ
∗





need only establish the relative size of Y and YG, as ρG2 > ρ
∗








which holds for g < r+k+V2(s2)r+k and where V2(s2) = p(r+ k− rxd) > 0 for s2 ∈ (0, 1).
Since g < 1 and r+k+V2(s2)r+k > 1, it follows that Y
G > Y indeed holds for all values of
g in the relevant interval. Therefore, ρG1 > ρ
∗
1 for g < 1 and the range of λH for which
the bank is liquid at t = 1 is diminished.
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